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I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause2 prohibits the admission of testimonial
*
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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statements by a witness who is absent from trial unless the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statements.3 Thus,
the Court imposed an absolute bar on the admission of testimonial statements in the
absence of a prior opportunity by the defendant to cross-examine those statements.4
Justice Scalia authored the opinion in which the Court reasoned that “the principal
evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused.”5
In establishing cross-examination as the prerequisite for the admission of
testimonial evidence, the Court in Crawford did not conclusively define the term
“testimonial.” Rather, it set forth various descriptions and examples of testimonial
statements without explicitly adopting a definition.6 Therefore, a determination of
whether a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a statement now requires a
determination of whether that statement is testimonial.
This Article will analyze whether the post-Crawford decisions have been
consistent in their treatment of statements that qualify as excited utterances7 in light
of the Confrontation Clause principles and various definitions of testimonial in
Crawford. Part II of this Article will provide a discussion of the Crawford decision
itself and an analysis of Crawford’s treatment of earlier cases in this area.8 Part III
of this Article will provide a discussion and analysis of court decisions that have
applied Crawford in the context of excited utterances.9 It will do this by examining
the factors that these courts have considered and emphasized in their analysis of
whether an excited utterance qualifies as a testimonial statement, which would
implicate the Confrontation Clause protections set forth in Crawford. Part IV of this
Article will discuss Crawford’s impact on the admission of excited utterances by
analyzing the various factors from the cases under the different formulations of
“testimonial” set forth in Crawford.10 Part IV will then propose a composite
definition of “testimonial” that will take into account the three definitions from
Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases. Part V of this Article
2

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .
. to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
3

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.

4

Id. at 61.

5

Id. at 50.

6

Id. at 51-52.

7

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an “excited utterance” is “not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.” FED. R. EVID. 803(2). The
Rule defines an excited utterance as a “statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant [is] under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition.”
Id. The underlying rationale for the admission of excited utterances under Rule 803(2) is that
a person who is still under the stress of an exciting event or experience is unlikely to possess
the reflective capacity that is needed to manufacture a lie. See, e.g., United States v. Taveras,
380 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 2004).
8

See infra notes 13-77 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 78-340 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 341-81 and accompanying text.
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concludes that the intended positive impact of the Crawford decision will be realized
only if courts refrain from applying its protections to situations that the Supreme
Court neither intended nor contemplated.11
II. RATIONALE OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND TREATMENT OF PRECEDENT
A. “Testimonial” Statements under Crawford.
Under Crawford, the threshold issue on a particular statement’s admissibility
against a defendant is whether the statement is testimonial. The Court in Crawford
declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,”12 but stated that the
term clearly “applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”13 Quoting
from the Petitioner’s brief, the Court stated that the core class of testimonial
statements comes in various forms: “‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross examine [such as a deposition], or
similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially.’”14
Another description of testimonial statements set forth by the Court in Crawford
are those “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”15 In general, the
definition of testimonial would include “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”16 A statement need not be
sworn in order to be classified as testimonial.17

11

See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.

12

See generally Ariana J. Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis
of Testimonial Hearsay Under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581 (2006) (proposing a
framework for deciding whether a statement is testimonial by considering the degree of
formality of the statement, the intent of the declarant and the law enforcement officer to whom
the statement was made, and the extent of government involvement in the production of the
statement).
13
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Court in Crawford left no
uncertainty in the area of police interrogations when declaring that “[s]tatements taken by
police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow
standard.” Id. at 52. The Court further clarified the meaning of testimonial statements in the
context of police interrogations in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006)
(holding that a statement is nontestimonial when purpose of interrogation is to enable police to
meet an ongoing emergency and testimonial when purpose of interrogation is to establish prior
events that may be relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution). See infra notes 225-340
and accompanying text for an analysis and discussion of both kinds of statements.
14
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No.
02-9410), 2003 WL 21939940).
15

Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)).
16
Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
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In its discussion of testimonial statements, the Court in Crawford was
particularly concerned about any statements given to officers or government agents
because “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance
does not.”18 The involvement of government representatives is an important factor in
the determination of whether evidence qualifies as “testimonial” under Crawford:
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with
any eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a
fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers
were keenly familiar. This consideration does not evaporate when
testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay exception,
even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances.19
The Court in Crawford limited its decision to testimonial hearsay, stating that
“[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.”20 With
respect to testimonial evidence, however, the Sixth Amendment requires both
unavailability of the declarant and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.21
The Court’s decision in Crawford overruled its prior decision in Ohio v.
Roberts.22 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of the statement of an unavailable
witness against a criminal defendant if the statement bears “adequate indicia of
reliability.”23 This test requires the evidence either to fall within a “firmly rooted
hearsay exception,” or to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”24
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington,
which was joined by Justice O’Connor. The Chief Justice did not agree with the
majority’s decision to overrule Ohio v. Roberts,25 or with the distinction made by the
majority between testimonial and nontestimonial statements.26 Chief Justice
21754961). In evaluating the various formulations of testimonial statements, the Court stated
that all “share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause’s coverage at
various levels of abstraction around it.” Id.
17

See id.; see also W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause
After Crawford v. Washington: Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 17-19
(2005).
18

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

19

Id. at 56 n.7.

20

Id. at 68.

21

Id.

22

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

23

Id. at 66.

24

Id.; see also Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1017-22 (1998) (arguing that the Roberts framework failed to reflect some of
the enduring principles of the Confrontation Clause).
25

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

26

Id. at 69-73.
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Rehnquist also took issue with the broad definition of testimonial statements adopted
by the majority:
[A]ny classification of statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn
affidavits and depositions will be somewhat arbitrary, merely a proxy for
what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been liberally
admitted as substantive evidence like it is today.27
Rehnquist would have reached the same result as the majority without overruling
Ohio v. Roberts. He reasoned that the statement at issue in Crawford was not
admissible based on Idaho v. Wright,28 which held that corroboration of an out-ofcourt statement’s truthfulness by other evidence at trial was an insufficient basis to
admit the statement.29
Prior to Crawford, the United States Supreme Court had never distinguished
between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.30 Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern in his concurring opinion that
the majority’s failure to clarify exactly what kind of evidence qualifies as
“testimonial” would result in confusion in the lower courts.31
B. Facts and Procedural History of Crawford
The defendant in Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife,
Sylvia.32 At the defendant’s trial for assault and attempted murder, the prosecution
played for the jury Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement to the police describing the
confrontation between the defendant and the victim.33 The defendant claimed selfdefense.34 Because of the state marital privilege barring a spouse from testifying
without the other spouse’s consent, Sylvia did not testify at the trial.35 Therefore, the
defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine Sylvia’s statement.36
Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement was admitted under the hearsay exception for
statements against penal interest based on her admission that she had led the
27

Id. at 71.

28

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

29

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Amber Allred Furbee,
Note, Legal Crossroads: The Hearsay Rule Meets the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
in Crawford v. Washington, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 999, 1050-59 (2005) (stating that
application of standards enunciated in Roberts and Wright would have produced the same
result reached by the majority in Crawford).
30

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 72 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also State v. Rivera, 844
A.2d 191, 202 n.13 (2004) (stating that the Crawford Court’s distinction between testimonial
and nontestimonial hearsay is a novel one under the Confrontation Clause).
31

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).

32

Id. at 38 (majority opinion).

33

Id.

34

Id. at 40.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 38.
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defendant to the victim’s apartment and thus had facilitated the assault.37 The
prosecution sought to use Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement as evidence that the
stabbing was not in self-defense.38 The defendant claimed that admission of Sylvia’s
statement violated his federal constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him under the Sixth Amendment.39 The trial court admitted the statement
based on Ohio v. Roberts,40 ruling that the statement was trustworthy under the
Roberts standard, and offered several reasons to support that determination.41
The jury convicted the defendant of assault, and the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed.42 The Court of Appeals held that Sylvia’s statement did not bear
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and offered several reasons in support of
its conclusion.43 The Washington Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s
conviction, concluding that the statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness.44
Specifically, the Washington Supreme Court relied on the similarities between the
defendant’s confession and Sylvia’s statement in reaching the conclusion that the
statement was trustworthy.45
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
prosecution’s use of Sylvia’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause, and the
Court reversed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.46
C. Crawford’s Treatment of Sixth Amendment Precedent
The Court in Crawford used the case as an opportunity to reconsider the standard
articulated in Ohio v. Roberts47 for the admissibility of an unavailable witness’s out

37

Id. at 40.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

41

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text and infra notes
47-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roberts.
42
Id. at 41. The Court of Appeals of Washington reversed the conviction in an
unpublished opinion. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II, 2001 WL 850119 (Wash. Ct. App.
July 30, 2001).
43

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.

44

See id.; State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002).

45

See Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663-64; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41-42. The Washington
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that Sylvia’s statement did not have to
bear guarantees of trustworthiness because the defendant waived his confrontation rights by
invoking the marital privilege. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 660. The court declined to force the
defendant to choose between the marital privilege and confronting his spouse. Id. The
prosecution did not challenge that holding in the United States Supreme Court. Crawford, 541
U.S. at 42 n.1.
46

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 68-69.

47

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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of court statement.48 The Court stated that the test in Ohio v. Roberts fails to protect
criminal defendants against typical Confrontation Clause violations.49
In Roberts, the defendant was charged with forgery of checks and possession of
stolen credit cards.50 At the preliminary hearing on the matter, the defendant’s
lawyer called a witness who testified that she knew the defendant and that she had
allowed the defendant to use her apartment for several days while she was away.51
The defendant’s attorney tried to obtain an admission from the witness that she had
given the checks and credit cards to the defendant without telling him that he did not
have permission to use them.52 The witness denied that she had done so.53
When the witness became unavailable for the trial, the prosecution sought to
admit the transcript of her testimony at the preliminary hearing.54 The trial court
admitted the transcript into evidence, and the defendant was convicted.55 The Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that the prosecution had failed to
make a good faith effort to secure the witness’s attendance.56 The Supreme Court of
Ohio affirmed on other grounds, holding that the witness was unavailable and that
the transcript was inadmissible at the defendant’s trial.57 The rationale was that even
though the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
preliminary hearing, this was not the equivalent of constitutional confrontation at
trial.58
In its analysis of whether the prior testimony of the witness at the preliminary
hearing bore “adequate indicia of reliability,” the United States Supreme Court in
Roberts declined to specify the level of questioning that would be sufficient to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of cross-examination.59 The Court held,
however, that the defendant’s attorney had tested the witness’s testimony “with the
equivalent of significant cross-examination.”60 Therefore, the Supreme Court relied
on the defendant’s prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness in its analysis of
48

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42.

49

Id. at 60.

50

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.

51

Id. The witness was the daughter of the couple from whom the defendant had allegedly
stolen the credit cards and the checks. Id.
52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 59.

55

Id. at 60.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 61.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 68-70.

60

Id. at 70. The Roberts Court stated that the defense attorney’s questioning of the witness
at the preliminary hearing “clearly partook of cross-examination as a matter of form,” id., and
that it “comported with the principal purpose of cross-examination:” challenging the
declarant’s veracity, perception, memory and intended meaning. Id. at 71.
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whether the transcript was sufficiently reliable.61 The Court in Crawford disagreed
with the rationale of Roberts but not the result.62
The Crawford opinion contains an extensive history of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause and the development of a criminal defendant’s right to
confront his or her accusers.63 The Court concluded that when dealing with
testimonial statements, the framers of the Constitution did not mean to “leave the
Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”64 The Confrontation Clause is concerned with
more than reliability of evidence.65 It is concerned with the manner in which the
reliability of evidence is tested, and the required test is cross-examination.66
The Court in Crawford cited to one of its earlier decisions, Dutton v. Evans,67 to
illustrate the limitations on the definition of testimonial statements.68 In Dutton, a
statement made to someone other than a law enforcement officer or agent of the
government was admissible against a defendant at his murder trial by the person to
whom the statement was made.69 Shaw’s testimony about what Williams had told
61

Id. at 73; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 151, 158-59 (1970) (Confrontation
Clause not violated by admission at trial of witness’s prior testimony from a preliminary
hearing—testimony that was given under oath and subject to cross examination—when
witness was testifying at trial and subject to full and effective cross-examination); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (Confrontation Clause not violated by admission
at trial of a transcribed copy of testimony of two witnesses from a previous trial, when
witnesses had died in the interim and were fully examined and cross-examined when they
testified in former trial); Thomas Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L.
REV. 747, 753, 784-87 (2005) (arguing that one of the ways to facilitate domestic violence
prosecutions after Crawford is to create more opportunities for cross-examination of victims in
preliminary hearings, depositions, and other pretrial proceedings).
62

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (stating that Roberts “hew[ed] closely to the traditional line” in
its outcome because of its emphasis on the defendant’s earlier opportunity to cross-examine
the witness).
63

Id. at 43-50. The decision sets forth the story of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh to
illustrate the inherent unfairness in a system that does not permit the accused to confront the
witnesses against him. Id. at 44-45. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of
the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557, 570-71 (1992); Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule:
The Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV.
763, 765-66 (2000).
64

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).

68

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.

69
Dutton, 400 U.S. at 77, 87-88. In Dutton, a prosecution witness named Shaw testified
that he and Williams, who was an accomplice of the defendant Evans in the alleged murder,
had been fellow prisoners during the time that Williams was arraigned on the murder charge.
Id. at 77. Shaw testified that when Williams returned to the penitentiary after the arraignment,
Shaw asked him how he had made out. Id. Shaw testified that Williams had responded, “‘If it
hadn’t been for [the defendant] Alex Evans, we wouldn’t be in this now.’” Id. The statement
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him was admitted on the basis of a Georgia statutory hearsay exception. The statute
provided that if a conspiracy had been proved, any statement made by a conspirator
“during the pendency of the criminal project” was admissible against any other
conspirator.70 The hearsay exception applied by Georgia allowed the introduction of
out-of-court statements made both during the course of the conspiracy and the
concealment of the conspiracy.71 The absence of a prior opportunity to crossexamine the statement in Dutton was not a bar to its admission because the statement
was not testimonial.72
The focus on government officers and agents in the determination of whether
statements qualify as testimonial casts some doubt on the holding in White v.
Illinois.73 The Court in Crawford acknowledged that its holding was not entirely
consistent with the holding of White.74 In White, statements of a child victim to an
The
investigating police officer were admitted as spontaneous declarations.75
Crawford Court acknowledged that its analysis was “in tension” with the holding in
White,76 but it declined to state specifically whether White survived the decision in
Crawford.77

was admitted over the objection of defense counsel, and Shaw was cross-examined at length.
Id. at 77-78.
70

Dutton, 400 U.S. at 78.

71

Id. at 81.

72

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. But see In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (holding that grandmother’s testimony about child’s statements to her regarding sexual
abuse implicated the Confrontation Clause even though the statements were not made to a
government official), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005). See infra note 328
for a discussion of In re E.H.
73

White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).

74

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.

75

White, 502 U.S. at 349-51.

76

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.

77

The Court later characterized the holding in White as the “one arguable exception” to the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements of unavailability of the witness and prior crossexamination in cases involving testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,
2275 (2006). In a concurring opinion in White, Justice Thomas noted that the Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence to that point had implicitly assumed that all hearsay declarants were
“witnesses against” a defendant within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. White, 502
U.S. at 359 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas
argued that neither the history nor the text of the Confrontation Clause supported this
assumption, id. at 358, and suggested the following interpretation of the Confrontation Clause:
“The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness who actually testifies
at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as
they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions.” Id. at 365. Justice Thomas reiterated this position in subsequent
decisions. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143-44 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First
Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998) (arguing that the
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III. IMPACT ON EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION
Federal and state courts have reached different conclusions on the admissibility
of excited utterances under Crawford based on their consideration of various factors
and the importance placed upon each one.78 A number of courts have concluded that
excited utterances, even when made to a police officer in response to some degree of
questioning, are not testimonial.79 Other courts have taken the opposite viewpoint,
reasoning that an excited utterance may be testimonial if the questioning by law
enforcement officers is for investigatory and fact-gathering purposes in anticipation
of a future prosecution.80 Structured and detailed questioning is more likely to result
in responses that implicate Crawford, even if the responses qualify as excited
utterances under state evidentiary rules.81
Confrontation Clause “encompasses only those ‘witnesses’ who testify either by taking the
stand in person or via government-prepared affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like”).
78

One view is that “[o]n paper, Crawford is a thorough originalist resolution of a
constitutional question. In application, however, the Court’s analysis raises substantial
questions and leaves them unanswered. Equally as significant as the Court’s holding, then, is
what it failed to resolve—and indeed explicitly declined to address.” See The Supreme Court,
2003 Term—Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 316, 321 (2004); see also Lininger, supra
note 61, at 777-81. Professor Lininger explains that the Crawford decision has caused lower
courts to be inconsistent in their application of various factors in cases involving domestic
violence prosecutions, and also suggests several reforms that would enable prosecutors to
convict batterers within the parameters set out in Crawford. Id.
The purpose of this Article is to provide an in-depth discussion of the various factors that
the courts have utilized and the context in which the factors arise in order to determine more
accurately whether an excited utterance is admissible against a defendant under Crawford.
79

See, e.g., United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding victim’s
statements to police officer not testimonial where police interaction with victim was
unstructured and questioning not suggestive).
80

See, e.g., Drayton v. United States, 877 A.2d 145, 150-51 (D.C. 2005) (finding that when
police questioned the victim, they were aware of the nature of the crime and the participants’
identities).
81

See, e.g., Siler v. Ohio, 543 U.S. 1019 (2004) (vacating State v. Siler, No. 02COA028,
2003 WL 22429053 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2003)). Even though approximately eight hours
had passed between the estimated time of the victim’s death and the statement of the victim’s
child to the officers, the child’s statement was admitted as an excited utterance because a child
may be under the stress and excitement of events related to a crime for a longer period than an
adult. Siler, 2003 WL 22429053, at *6. In addition, the child gave his statement to the
officers in the course of two interviews. Id. The first interview lasted between thirty and
forty-five minutes, and the second interview lasted for one hour. Id.
On remand, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the police had obtained the child’s
statements through “a structured police interrogation” and that the statements were, therefore,
testimonial. State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), appeal allowed, 847
N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006).
In light of Crawford, the Supreme Court has remanded for further consideration, three
cases in which statements made to the police were admitted against defendants at trial based
on hearsay exceptions other than the excited utterance. See Goff v. Ohio, 541 U.S. 1083
(2004) (admitting the statement of defendant’s wife made to police at trial as a statement
against penal interest when the wife was unavailable for trial). On remand, the Ohio Court of
Appeals held that statements made by Mr. Goff’s wife to the police while they were
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Courts that agree on the result in these cases still differ on their rationales. Some
court decisions that have held excited utterances to be nontestimonial focus on the
fact that the declarant initiated the contact with police and gave the statement without
first being approached. Others emphasize that even if the declarant provided the
statement in response to questioning, the questioning must be sufficiently structured
and controlled to bring the statement within the Crawford rule. Still others examine
the declarant’s motivation in providing the statement and conclude that it is
nontestimonial if given to obtain aid or to reduce the level of danger and not to aid
law enforcement in a future prosecution.82
The Supreme Court has confirmed that courts must distinguish between
statements that are made to address an ongoing emergency (nontestimonial) and
statements that are made to provide information that can be used in a later
prosecution (testimonial).83 Although the Court’s decision in Davis somewhat
clarified Crawford’s reach, the line between these two kinds of statements can be
difficult to draw.84 A combination of these factors in any one case only exacerbates
the difficulty.85

interrogating her were not admissible against Mr. Goff at his trial. State v. Goff, No. 21320,
2005 WL 236377, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2005).
See also Prasertphong v. Arizona, 75 P.3d 675 (Ariz. 2003), vacated, 541 U.S. 1039
(2004) (admitting statements made to police by an individual involved in the crime for which
the defendant was prosecuted as statements against penal interest); People v. Castille, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), vacated, Shields v. California, 541 U.S. 930 (2004)
(admitting statements made by co-defendants to police in a joint interview against each
defendant as adoptive admissions and statements of a party—two firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions). On remand, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding
that an adoptive admission elicited during a joint police interrogation does not implicate the
Sixth Amendment or Crawford. See People v. Castille, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 81-85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005).
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded a case to the
district court to consider whether the use of guilty plea allocutions of alleged co-conspirators
against a defendant to prove the charged conspiracy violates Crawford. United States v.
Pandy, No. 03-1553, 2004 WL 960023, at *1-2 (2d Cir. May 5, 2004).
82
See State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 812-13 (Minn. 2005) (listing eight factors or
considerations to guide courts when determining whether a particular statement is testimonial),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme
Court of Minnesota for further consideration in light of Davis).
83

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

84

Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that the modified standard in Davis “yields no predictable results to police officers and
prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”).
85

See generally John F. Yetter, Wrestling With Crawford v. Washington and the New
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. BAR. J. 26, 29 (2004) (“One can imagine, for
instance, excited utterances subdivided into ‘really excited utterances’ that are nontestimonial
statements, standard ‘excited utterances’ that could go either way, and ‘mildly excited
utterances’ that would be admissible under the hearsay exception but excluded because they
contain ‘testimonial’ statements.”).
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A. Contact Initiated by Declarant
A number of court decisions issued after Crawford have held excited utterances
to be nontestimonial when the declarant makes the statement after initiating contact
with law enforcement authorities. Because the declarant initiates the interaction in
these cases, the statement is not taken “in the course of [a police] interrogation,”86
and, therefore, is not testimonial. Even though the statement might still qualify as “a
formal statement to government officers,”87 the absence of interrogation or formal
questioning is regarded as more significant.88
An example of this scenario is Leavitt v. Arave.89 In Leavitt, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court properly admitted an
excited utterance made by the victim to the police, reasoning that the statement was
not “testimonial” under Crawford.90 In Leavitt, the victim had been frightened on the
night before her death by a prowler at her home.91 She called the police and told
them that she thought the prowler was the defendant because he had tried to talk
himself into her home earlier that day.92 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s
argument that admission of the hearsay testimony violated his rights under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.93 The court acknowledged that the question
was close but “[did] not believe that [the victim’s] statements [were] of the kind with
which Crawford was concerned, namely, testimonial statements.”94 The court went
on to explain the distinction between the victim’s statements and the statements in
Crawford:
86

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).

87
Id. at 51. It is worth noting that subsequent to its decision in Crawford, the Supreme
Court stated in dicta that statements made in the absence of interrogation could also qualify as
testimonial. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1. The Supreme Court dealt only with statements
produced as the result of interrogations because those were the only statements involved in
Davis and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana. See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington,
126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
88

See Dickinson, supra note 63, at 806-09. Mr. Dickinson describes the difference
between these kinds of statements as follows:
The difference is subtle, yet defensible. The key is to look at the circumstances
surrounding the giving of the out-of-court statement to the government. For instance,
if a witness walks up to a police officer and announces, “I saw Jim shoot Lisa,” that
type of situation in no way resembles the sorts of abuses concerning the framers. This
wholly unsolicited statement does not resemble the prosecutorial abuses common in
the trial by affidavit scenario because the statement was not elicited by the government
for purposes of trial.
Id. at 807 n.364.
89

Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1105 (2005).

90

Id. at 683.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 683 n.22.
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We do not think that [the victim’s] statements to the police she called to
her home fall within the compass of [the examples of the types of
statements that qualify as testimonial in the Crawford decision. The
victim], not the police, initiated their interaction. She was in no way
being interrogated by them but instead sought their help in ending a
frightening intrusion into her home. Thus, we do not believe that the
admission of her hearsay statements against [the defendant] implicate “the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed[:] . . . the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.”95
During the defendant’s murder trial in State v. Barnes,96 the court used similar
reasoning in admitting statements made by the defendant’s mother to a police officer,
following a prior assault.97 The officer testified that in March 1998 the defendant’s
mother drove herself to the police station, entered the station crying and sobbing and
stated that her son had assaulted her and threatened to kill her.98 The court admitted
the testimony as an excited utterance.99
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine concluded that the victim’s statements to
the police were not testimonial under Crawford.100 The court based its conclusion on
the fact that the victim had gone to the police station on her own, not because the
police had sought her out or requested her presence.101 In addition, the victim was
still under the stress of the event when she made the statements, and any questions
posed by the police were for the purpose of determining why she was distressed.102
There was an absence of structured police questioning, and the police had no reason
to believe that any wrongdoing had occurred until the victim made her statements.103
In State v. Anderson,104 a group of juveniles flagged down a police officer who
was attempting to locate the source of an activated burglar alarm.105 The officer
stopped and asked the group what was going on, and the juveniles told him that a
“large black man with a bald head just kicked in the door of a business across the

95

Id. at 684 n.22 (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 50 (2004)).
96

State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004).

97

Id. at 209.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id. at 211.

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. The court=s reasoning in Barnes touches upon some of the other factors that are
discussed infra.
104

State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 27, 2005), aff’d, 183 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 47 (2006).
105

Id. at *1.
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street” and that he was “still inside.”106 The officer drove to the business, discovered
the door open and found the defendant inside.107
The court in Anderson held that the statements were admissible as excited
utterances and did not fit into any of the core testimonial categories as set forth in
Crawford.108 The court went on to explain that “the essential characteristics that
cause the juveniles’ statements to fall within the ambit of the excited utterance
exception conflict with the characteristics that would make them testimonial.”109
A shortcoming in the Anderson court’s analysis is that it links the evidentiary
issue too closely with the Confrontation Clause issue.110 A rationale that would be
more consistent with Crawford would hold that the juveniles’ excited utterances
were not testimonial because of their actions in initiating contact with the police.111
In affirming the admission of the statements on appeal, the Tennessee Supreme
Court emphasized that the police were in a “preliminary investigational mode” when
they spoke to the witnesses.112 They were trying to determine exactly what was
happening and were not gathering evidence for a future prosecution.113
These cases illustrate one factor to be used by lower courts in their application of
Crawford. When the declarant initiates the contact with governmental authorities
and makes a statement, the statement falls outside of the definition of “testimonial”
in Crawford. In such cases, the law of evidence determines admissibility of the

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at *3-4.

109

Id. at *4.

110
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“Leaving the regulation of outof-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to
prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”).
111
See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
the victim’s statements to the 911 operator were not testimonial because the victim initiated
the 911 call to request assistance); People v. Mackey, 785 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871-74 (2004)
(holding that the statements of the domestic assault victim, who approached a police officer
seated in the passenger seat of a van that was stopped in traffic at a red light, were not
testimonial because the victim initiated contact with the police officer immediately after the
incident in order to seek immediate protection); People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL
2567124, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004) (holding that the restaurant employee’s statement
to police that the defendant “just robbed me. He just robbed us in Burger King.” immediately
following a robbery of the restaurant was not testimonial because the employee, who was
injured in the robbery, initiated the exchange and did not make the statement in response to
any police questioning); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 24-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that statements of the victim were not testimonial because the victim, not the police, initiated
the statements immediately after the rescue from the criminal incident without the police
asking any questions), aff’d, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2977
(2006) (judgment vacated and case remanded to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for
further consideration in light of Davis), dismissed as moot, 636 S.E.2d 565 (N.C. 2006)
(dismissing in light of defendant’s death).
112

State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 353 (Tenn. 2006).

113

Id.
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statement. The focus in these cases is on the declarant’s timing in the making of the
excited utterance, and it is irrelevant that the statement is made to a law enforcement
officer or government official.
B. Location of Interaction Between the Declarant and the Law Enforcement Agents
and Extent of Structure and Formality of Questioning
Another factor that courts have considered in their application of Crawford is
whether questioning of the declarant by law enforcement agents is structured and
formal.114 In most cases dealing with this factor, the location of the questioning is a
consideration in the court’s analysis. If the questions are informal and unstructured,
the courts are more inclined to characterize any statements procured from such
questions as nontestimonial. This situation arises if the questioning takes place at the
scene of the incident itself or at a location other than the police station, such as a
hospital.
Other courts have placed more emphasis on whether the questioning is structured
and formal and less emphasis on the location.115 In these cases, the courts seem
concerned with the fact that a governmental authority is procuring information
through direct questions, even if the questions are few in number and asked at the
scene of the incident.116 The courts have held that statements generated under such
circumstances, even if admissible as excited utterances, may implicate the
Confrontation Clause under Crawford.117
In People v. Cage,118 the California Court of Appeals had to evaluate three
different hearsay statements from the victim, who had sustained a cut on his neck
during a fight with the defendant (his mother). The victim stated that his mother had
slashed him with a piece of glass. He made this statement to a police officer at the

114
This factor is derived from the language in the Crawford decision where the Court
discussed testimonial statements coming in the form of “custodial examinations” and a
declarant “mak[ing] a formal statement to government officers.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
115

See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.

116

See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552 (Mass. 2005) (“[S]tatements
made in response to questioning by law enforcement agents are per se testimonial, except
when the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or provide
medical care.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006); Watson, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15
(whether questioning constitutes interrogation is not determined by the number of questions
asked by a police officer or law enforcement agent); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 836
N.E.2d 335, 338-39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (applying the “per se” rule announced in
Gonsalves).
117

See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing view that the
excited nature of the utterance is secondary to the declarant’s objectively reasonable
expectations of whether the statement would be used prosecutorally), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2983 (2006); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 811 (arguing against the “unwarranted and unduly
restrictive” distinction “between statements made in formalized testimonial settings versus
informal investigative settings”).
118

People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review granted,
99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). The California Supreme Court has ordered supplemental briefing in the
matter so that the parties can address the effect of Davis on the issues presented in Cage.
People v. Cage, No. S127344, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8013 (Cal. June 28, 2006).
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hospital, to a doctor at the hospital, and to the same police officer at the police
station.119 The trial court admitted the statements under the California Evidence
Code as both spontaneous statements and a victim’s report of a physical injury.120
The court in Cage held that the statement to the doctor at the hospital was clearly
nontestimonial and that the statement to the police officer at the police station was
clearly testimonial.121 On the statement to the police officer at the hospital, the court
held that the statement was not testimonial “because the interview was not
sufficiently analogous to a pretrial examination by a justice of the peace; among
other things, the police had not yet focused on a crime or a suspect, there was no
structured questioning, and the interview was informal and unrecorded.”122
The lack of formality and structure in the manner of questioning, in addition to
the fact that it took place at a hospital and not in a courtroom or station house,
persuaded the court in Cage that the interview was not an interrogation.123
Therefore, the statement was admissible as a spontaneous or excited utterance and
was not testimonial under Crawford.124
In contrast to the holding in Cage, the court in Wall v. State125 held that a police
interview of a witness at a hospital was structured questioning.126 In Wall, one of the
victims of an assault provided a statement to the police detailing how the defendant
had made several racial epithets and then attacked his victims with a wooden
board.127 When the victim was unavailable to testify at trial, a deputy testified as to
what the victim had told him in response to the deputy’s questioning at the
hospital.128 The trial court admitted the victim’s statements as excited utterances,
and the defendant challenged the admission of the statements as a violation of his
right to confront the witnesses against him.129
The issue on appeal was “whether a non-testifying witness’s statement made to a
police officer during investigation of a crime and incriminating the defendant, is

119

Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848.

120

Id. at 850.

121

Id. at 848. The victim’s statement to the police officer at the police station was a
recorded station-house interview identical to the one at issue in Crawford, and the statement to
the doctor was not made to the police or an agent of the police. Id. at 854-55.
122

Id. at 848; see also Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding
that victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and
victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005).
123

Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856-57.

124

Id. at 857.

125

Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d, 184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
126

Id. at 851.

127

Id. at 848.

128

Id.

129

Id.
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admissible against the defendant.”130 In reliance on the standard for interrogation
from Crawford as a statement “knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning,” the court in Wall held that an interview of a witness at a hospital is
“structured police questioning” and, therefore, an interrogation under Crawford.131
The victim’s statement was held to be “testimonial” under the standard in
Crawford.132
It is difficult to distinguish Cage and Wall from each other on their facts.
Perhaps one difference is that in Cage, the law enforcement agent was still trying to
determine whether a crime had been committed at the time he conducted the
interview.133 The court in Cage stated that the deputy engaged in no structured
questioning but simply extended “an open-ended invitation for [the victim] to tell his
story.”134 In Wall, however, the deputy’s questioning of the victim was more
specifically related to the investigation of a crime.135 The cases clearly illustrate the
difficulty that courts have encountered in the application of Crawford in this context.
That application, however, may become somewhat less difficult in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington.136 In Davis, the Court
distinguished between interrogations that occur during an ongoing emergency and
interrogations that occur when the emergency has ceased.137 Thus, even if the
interview in Cage was informal and unrecorded, the fact that the police were asking
questions some time after the incident in an effort to establish past events would
seem to make the victim’s statement to the police testimonial under Davis. The
130

Id. at 849.

131

Id. at 851.

132

Id. Applying the standard of an “objectively reasonable declarant standing in the shoes
of the actual declarant[,]” the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a reasonable person
would have realized that the officers were investigating a criminal occurrence and were
gathering evidence for a prosecution. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742-45 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). The Court of Criminal Appeals, therefore, agreed with the Court of Appeals that
admission of the statement violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id.
at 745. The Court of Criminal Appeals also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
erroneous admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it did
not contribute to the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 745-46. The Court of Criminal Appeals
remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the confrontation
violation was harmful during the punishment stage of the proceeding. Id. at 746-47.
The holding of the Texas Court of Appeals in Wall is also in stark contrast to its holding in
Cassidy. See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-16 (Tex. App. 2004) (holding that
victim’s statement to police officer at hospital was admissible as an excited utterance and that
victim’s interview by police officer was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 925 (2005); see also Tyler v. State, 167 S.W.3d 550, 553-54 (Tex. App.
2005) (pointing out apparent conflict between Wall and Cassidy).
133

People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
134

Id. at 856-57.

135

Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 848, 851.

136

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).

137

Id. at 2273-74.
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Supreme Court of California will reconsider the result in Cage in light of the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis.138
A statement would seem to qualify as testimonial under Davis if it is made in
response to any police questioning that occurs after the threatening incident is no
longer in progress,139 even if the questioning takes place at the scene of the incident
itself and elicits a statement that qualifies as an excited utterance under state
evidentiary law. The Supreme Court deemphasized the requirement that the
questioning be formal and structured in its decision in Davis,140 which was a point of
emphasis for several courts in the immediate aftermath of Crawford.
For example, in United States v. Webb,141 the police officer conducted the
questioning right at the scene. In Webb, the court held that statements made in
response to investigatory questioning at the scene of a criminal event soon after the
occurrence of the criminal event were not made in response to police interrogation as
contemplated by Crawford.142 In Webb, a police officer arrived on the scene of an
assault and asked the victim, “What happened?”143 The victim responded, “[the
defendant] punched me with a closed fist two times in the face.”144 When the police
officer asked her why, the victim responded that she had refused to give the
defendant money for drugs and that the two had gotten into an argument as a
result.145
The court in Webb reasoned that the police officer’s main concern in asking the
questions was to investigate the situation and to ascertain what had happened.146 In
addition, “[t]he situation did not resemble a formal police investigation at a police
station.”147 Therefore, the victim’s statements were admitted as excited utterances.148
138

People v. Cage, No. S127344, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 8013 (Cal. June 28, 2006) (ordering the
parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Davis on the issues presented in
the case).
139

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79.

140
The Court in Davis did not entirely reject the notion that the degree of formality of the
statement is an important consideration in the determination of whether the statement is
testimonial. Id. at 2278 n.5. The Court did, however, characterize the distinction between
“formal” and “informal” statements as “vague.” Id.
141

United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9,

2004).
142

Id. at *3.

143

Id. at *1.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id. at *3.

147

Id. at *4.

148

Id. at *4-5; see also Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 351, 353-54 (Alaska Ct. App.
2005) (holding that injured man’s response to police officer’s question, “What happened?”,
was not testimonial under Crawford because it was not given in response to interrogation),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding case to the Court of
Appeals of Alaska for further consideration in light of Davis).
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In two cases decided by the Indiana Court of Appeals, statements by a domestic
violence victim to a police officer were held to be nontestimonial because of the
informal nature of the questioning. In Fowler v. State,149 the court held that a
domestic assault victim’s statement to a police officer, who asked the victim what
had happened ten minutes after arriving at the residence in response to a 911 call,
was not a testimonial statement and was therefore admissible under Crawford.150
The victim responded that her husband, the defendant, “had punched her several
times in the face.”151 Despite the lapse of time between the police officer’s arrival
and the victim’s statement, the court in Fowler concluded that the victim’s statement
was an excited utterance.152
On the issue of admissibility of the statement under Crawford, the court in
Fowler held “that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in response to a
request for assistance and begin informally questioning those nearby immediately
thereafter in order to determine what has happened, statements given in response
thereto are not ‘testimonial.’”153 The court emphasized that the investigation was
still in a preliminary stage and that the police were asking questions at the scene of
the incident shortly after it occurred.154
In a concurring opinion in Fowler, Judge Crone took the position that Crawford
did not apply to the facts of the case.155 Judge Crone stated that although the
domestic assault victim in the case had been uncooperative, she testified at trial and
was therefore subject to cross-examination regarding the statements that she made to
the police at the scene.156 Judge Crone concluded his concurring opinion with the
following statement: “The fallout from Justice Scalia’s ‘clarification’ of the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford will reverberate through the evidentiary landscape
for some time to come and will create countless dilemmas for trial and appellate
courts . . . .” 157
149

Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006).
150

Id. at 961, 964.

151

Id. at 961.

152

Id. at 962.

153

Id. at 964.

154

Id. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding that [the
victim’s] account [of the assault to the police] was testimonial.” Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d
459, 464 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006). Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the statement was properly admitted and affirmed the defendant’s conviction on the
ground that the victim had appeared at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Id. at 46466. Under the standard announced in Davis, the Indiana Supreme Court was correct that the
victim’s account was testimonial because the “primary purpose” of the police questioning was
to establish the prior criminal incident, which was no longer ongoing at that point. See Davis
v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
155

Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 965 (Crone, J., concurring).

156

Id. at 966. The Indiana Supreme Court agreed with Justice Crone’s position that the
victim’s appearance at trial satisfied the Confrontation Clause. See Fowler, 829 N.E.2d at
464-65.
157

Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 966 (Crone, J., concurring).
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Similarly, in Hammon v. State,158 which the Supreme Court reversed as the
companion case to Davis v. Washington,159 the court held that statements made by a
domestic violence victim to an investigating officer were not testimonial under
Crawford.160 The victim’s statements were admissible as excited utterances because
the victim made the statements to the police after a startling event that had recently
taken place.161 Even though the victim gave her statement in direct response to
police questioning, it was not an interrogation as defined in Crawford.162 Using
some of the language from Fowler, the court in Hammon reasoned as follows:
We thus hold that when police arrive at the scene of an incident in
response to a request for assistance and begin informally questioning
those nearby immediately thereafter in order to determine what has
happened, statements given in response thereto are not “testimonial.”
Whatever else police “interrogation” might be, we do not believe that
word applies to preliminary investigatory questions asked at the scene of a
crime shortly after it has occurred. Such interaction with witnesses on the
scene does not fit within a lay conception of police “interrogation,”
bolstered by television, as encompassing an “interview” in a room at the
stationhouse. It also does not bear the hallmarks of an improper
“inquisitorial practice.”163
The courts in Webb, Fowler and Hammon separated the police activity into two
distinct stages: the initial determination of what actually occurred, and if the
occurrence constituted a crime, the investigation of the crime itself. These courts
reasoned that any answers to police questioning during the former stage were
nontestimonial statements because the Court in Crawford emphasized the importance
of “formal statement[s] to government officers”164 and described the “striking
resemblance [between police interrogations and] examinations by justices of the

158

Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
159

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-80.

160

Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952.

161

Id. at 948-49.

162

Id. at 952.

163

Id.; see also People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that preliminary questions asked at the crime scene shortly after the crime occurred constituted
an “unstructured interaction” between the officer and the witness and not an interrogation);
State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005) (holding that police who ask preliminary
questions to ascertain the level of danger when responding to emergency calls are not
gathering information to make a case against a suspect), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006).
The Indiana Supreme Court in Hammon agreed with the Court of Appeals that responses to
initial inquiries at a crime scene typically would not qualify as testimonial statements.
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126
S. Ct. 2266 (2006). The Indiana Supreme Court declined to adopt the view, however, that
excited utterances are per se nontestimonial. Id.
164

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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peace in England[,]” in the 16th and 17th centuries.165 If the police ask questions
during the former stage, any answers to those questions constitute statements that are
not testimonial. When the police possess little or no information about a particular
occurrence, it follows that they will not be able to ask questions that are formal and
structured as contemplated by Crawford.166 Responses to the more detailed
questions asked during the investigatory stage, however, produce testimonial
statements that are subject to the rule of Crawford.
Under Davis v. Washington, police questioning at either stage will produce
testimonial statements so long as the criminal incident is not ongoing and the
“primary purpose” of the questioning is to establish the prior incident in a way that
could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.167 The degree of formality is
still a consideration in the determination of whether a statement is testimonial,168 but
the Court in Davis seemed to break from the rationale of Crawford when it stated
that “[i]t imports sufficient formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are
criminal offenses.”169
An illustration of this two stage procedure that appears to be consistent with the
distinction made in Davis (between statements to meet an emergency—which are
nontestimonial—and statements to establish a past event—which are testimonial) is
evidenced in Stancil v. United States.170 In Stancil, the evidence against the
defendant consisted solely of the testimony of a police officer who appeared at the
home of the defendant and his wife in response to a 911 call. The police officer
testified to certain statements that the defendant’s wife had made to him shortly after
the police arrived on the scene.171 The trial judge allowed the statements to be
admitted as excited utterances.172 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
statements were testimonial under Crawford and should have been excluded because
he had not cross-examined them.173
165

Id. at 52.

166

See also People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24,
2004) (finding that victim’s excited utterance was not testimonial because victim was
seriously injured when police found him and that the question of “What happened?” did not
constitute an interrogation when victim responded that a person named Rick had shot him),
remanded, 722 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2006) (remanding to court of appeals for reconsideration
in light of Davis in lieu of granting leave to appeal).
167

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

168

Id. at 2278 n.5.

169

Id. As Justice Thomas pointed out in his dissent, the possibility of criminal proceedings
being brought against a person who makes a false oral statement to a police officer “may
render honesty in casual conversations with police officers important. It does not, however,
render those conversations solemn or formal in the ordinary meanings of those terms.” Id. at
2283 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
170

Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, 878 A.2d
1186 (D.C. 2005).
171

Id. at 801.

172

Id. at 801-02.

173

Id. at 802.
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The court in Stancil remanded the case for additional findings on whether the
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated.174 The court
reasoned that the activities of the police at the apartment during the investigation of
the 911 call were divided into two distinct stages.175 Statements by the defendant’s
wife to the police during the first stage, before the police had restored order and
began asking questions, were not testimonial and could be admitted as evidence
under the excited utterance exception.176 Statements made by the defendant’s wife to
the police after the police had secured the scene, statements that were in response to
questions that the police asked her, took on a “testimonial character” and would
ordinarily be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.177 The court in Stancil
stated that the types of statements cited by the Court in Crawford as testimonial “all
involve a declarant’s knowing responses to structured questioning in an investigative
environment.”178 The “investigative environment, however, could be a home or a
hotel room under the right circumstances.”179
In People v. Watson,180 the court had to determine whether a series of statements
were testimonial under Crawford when made by an employee of a Burger King
Restaurant immediately following a robbery of the restaurant.181 Immediately after
the police captured the suspects, the employee, who was bleeding profusely from an
injury suffered during the robbery, stated to the police that the defendant “just
robbed me. He just robbed us in Burger King.”182 The police officer then asked the
employee whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, and the
employee responded that the defendant had acted alone.183 Finally, when the police
officer asked the employee to describe what happened, the employee described the
defendant’s actions in entering the Burger King Restaurant, revealing a gun and
demanding money from the safe.184
The employee made his second statement in response to a police question about
whether any other perpetrators were involved in the robbery, but it was not a
structured question that was asked in anticipation of trial.185 Rather, the police
wanted to secure the area where the robbery had occurred and determine whether
they should search for other robbers in the vicinity.186 Therefore, this statement was
174

Id. at 815.

175

Id. at 814.

176

Id. at 815.

177

Id. at 813, 815.

178

Id. at 812.

179

Id. at 812 n.25.

180

People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2004).

181

Id. at *1-2, *13-15.

182

Id. at *2.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185

Id. at *14.

186

Id.
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not testimonial and could be introduced at the defendant’s trial without violating
Crawford.187
The employee’s final statement, however, was made in response to structured
questioning by the police.188 When the police asked the employee what had
happened, they had already placed the defendant in custody and were trying to obtain
information to further their investigation and eventual prosecution of the
defendant.189 Given the circumstances that existed at the time of the questioning, the
employee should have been aware that the information would be used at future
judicial proceedings.190 Therefore, the court in Watson concluded that the
employee’s third statement was testimonial in nature and could not be introduced
against the defendant at trial because it was not subject to cross-examination.191 The
court rejected the argument that no interrogation had taken place because the police
had asked only two questions:
Interrogation, even as that term is used in the colloquial sense, is not
determined by the number of questions asked. When a police officer or
any other law enforcement agent questions a potential witness for the
purpose of gathering information to aid in a suspect’s prosecution, and the
witness is aware of the purpose of the officer’s questions, structured
questioning amounting to an interrogation has occurred. That the officer
obtained all of the pertinent information from a single question is of no
moment.192
The court in Watson permitted the police to determine what actually occurred
without excluding the statements made by the employee in the course of that process.
Once the police determined what had happened at the restaurant, however, the court
characterized as “interrogation” any questions that followed. Law enforcement
agents, therefore, are capable of producing both testimonial and nontestimonial
statements within a short period of time from the same witness. Moreover, it is not
always possible to draw a precise line of demarcation between the police officers’ act
of responding to an emergency and the act of gathering evidence for the subsequent
prosecution.193

187

Id.

188

Id. at *15.

189

Id.

190

Id. at *15.

191

Id.

192

Id. This analysis illustrates how the above-stated factors work together in adjudicating
the issue of whether a particular statement is testimonial. The Watson court’s conclusion that
the police were engaging in structured questioning, an interrogation, followed directly from its
conclusion that the police were gathering evidence for a future prosecution. See infra notes
292-340 and accompanying text for a discussion of statements to be used as evidence in a
future prosecution.
193

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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In People v. Victors,194 the defendant was charged with domestic battery. A
couple in an adjoining room, the Doerrs, heard “slapping-type” and “thumping”
noises coming from the room in which the defendant and the victim were staying.195
The Doerrs also heard the defendant speak in a loud, angry voice and call the victim
an offensive name.196 When the Doerrs heard the victim tell the defendant to stop,
Mr. Doerr called the police and spoke to them upon their arrival.197
One of the officers on the scene spoke to the victim.198 The victim informed the
officer that she and the defendant had an argument, and the argument escalated into
the defendant pushing her, pulling her hair, punching her and choking her.199 At
trial, the State sought to have the officer testify about what the victim had told him
because the victim did not testify.200 The trial court admitted the victim’s statements
as excited utterances.201
The court in Victors rejected the claim that the victim’s statements to the police
officers constituted excited utterances and held that the admission of the police
officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s statements to him violated the rule
announced in Crawford.202 The court reasoned that the victim made the statements
to the police in response to their questions while they were investigating a possible
crime.203 Because the police officer’s testimony was offered to establish an element
of the crime with which the defendant had been charged, it constituted testimonial
evidence under Crawford.204 The Victors case is another example of the distinction
between the initial determination by the police of what actually occurred and police
investigation of the crime itself. By distinguishing between the initial police
response to the incident and the subsequent police investigation of the incident, the
court in Victors correctly anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Malley disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that the victim’s statements were not excited utterances.205 On whether
194

People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), appeal denied, 830 N.E.2d 8
(Ill. 2005).
195

Id. at 314.

196

Id.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 314.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 315.

202

Id. at 320. In ruling that the statements were not excited utterances, the court in Victors
did not specify the evidentiary rule that would provide for the admission of the statements.
See infra note 205.
203

Victors, 819 N.E.2d at 320.

204

Id. at 320-21.

205

Id. at 321 (O’Malley, J., concurring). Justice O’Malley also took issue with the
majority’s decision to reach the federal Confrontation Clause issue under Crawford when it
had already decided that the statement was excluded on evidentiary grounds under Illinois
state law. Id. at 323.
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the victim’s statements were testimonial under Crawford, Justice O’Malley stated the
following:
With the ink hardly dry on Crawford’s Copernican shift in federal
constitutional law, a panel of the Illinois Appellate Court plummets
undaunted, but for no good reason, into the murky waters left in
Crawford’s wake. In its zeal, the majority stretches the definition of
“testimonial” to unprecedented girth in Illinois.206
Because the victim gave her statement to the police in an informal setting without
any structured questioning and only minutes after the incident had occurred,
reasoned Justice O’Malley, the victim’s statement was not testimonial under
Crawford.207 It is another example of the uncertainty involved in trying to identify
the precise point in time when the police have ceased to respond to the incident and
have begun to gather evidence.
In Samarron v. State,208 the declarant was standing among a group of men who
were approached by a second group of men. A man in the second group stabbed Mr.
Villatoro, who was in the declarant’s group, and another man from the second group
hit Mr. Villatoro over the head with a hammer.209 Mr. Villatoro died from his
injuries, and the declarant gave a statement to the police one hour after the
incident.210 Based on the declarant’s statement, the police were able to identify the
defendant as the man who had stabbed Mr. Villatoro.211 The declarant did not testify
at trial, and his statement was admitted as an excited utterance.212
The court in Samarron held that the admission of the declarant’s statement
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the statement
was testimonial.213 The declarant had not spontaneously provided his statement to
206

Id. at 323.

207

Id. at 324. In Justice O’Malley’s view, the police were still trying to determine exactly
what had happened when they spoke to the victim. Id. When asked how he conducted the
questioning of the victim, the police officer testified, “I asked her basically . . . what was
happening.” Id.; see also State v. Alvarez, 107 P.3d 350, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that victim’s excited utterance to police, which was obtained in response to questioning, was
not testimonial because police did not know that a crime had been committed when they spoke
to victim and were still trying to ascertain what had happened), petition for review granted in
part, No. CR-05-0104-PR, 2005 Ariz. LEXIS 127 (Ariz. 2005), and remanded by No. CR-050104-PR, 2006 Ariz. LEXIS 96 (Ariz. 2006), vacated in part and aff’d, 143 P.3d 668 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2006). On remand from the Arizona Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
Davis, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the victim gave his statement to
the police during an ongoing emergency in order to obtain medical assistance for his serious
injuries, and that the officer’s purpose in asking the victim “what happened?” was to assist the
victim and to meet the emergency. Alvarez, 143 P.3d at 674.
208

Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

209

Id. at 702.

210

Id. at 703.

211

Id.

212

Id.

213

Id. at 706.
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the police.214 It was a formal, signed, written statement given in response to
questions from the police.215 The admission of the statement violated the defendant’s
right to confront the witnesses against him because he had no opportunity to cross
examine it.216 Because the statement was in writing, it was the “functional
equivalent” of “ex parte in-court testimony” discussed in Crawford.217
Under Crawford, informal questioning and gathering of information from
witnesses and victims at the scene of a crime produced nontestimonial statements
that could be used against a defendant at a subsequent prosecution without violating
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Under Davis, the emphasis is more on
the timing of the questioning than on the formality of it. Therefore, police
questioning of witnesses and victims at the scene of an incident that takes place after
the police have neutralized any danger at the scene will produce testimonial
statements.218 Informal, unstructured questioning designed to ascertain what
happened or to address an ongoing incident does not constitute an interrogation as
defined in Crawford,219 and this analysis is still valid after Davis. When the
questioning becomes more structured and organized, with the information gathered
from it to be used in a future prosecution, such use violates the defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights unless he or she has the opportunity to cross-examine
the statements. The questioning is likely to become more structured and organized
when the police determine that a crime has been committed and are seeking to learn
the identity of the perpetrator or the manner of its commission.
Although some cases place significance on the location of the questioning, with a
hospital deemed to be a less formal atmosphere than a police station,220 the court in
Stancil v. United States221 stated that a home or hotel room could constitute an
“investigative environment” under the right circumstances. In addition, the court in
People v. Watson222 concluded that even two questions can constitute structured
questioning if law enforcement personnel have placed the suspect in custody prior to

214

Id. at 707.

215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).

218

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).

219

See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 562-63 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J.,
concurring in part) (“‘[P]olice interrogation’ does not encompass the basic, immediate, onscene questioning of persons present in an attempt to get the gist of what is happening or has
just happened, i.e., to ascertain why police were called to the scene and what steps need to be
taken in response.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).
220

See Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
925 (2005); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), petition for review
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
221
Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 812 n.25 (D.C. 2005), reh’g en banc granted,
878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005).
222

People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8,

2004).
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asking the questions. When the witness’s statement is written223 or recorded,224 it is
likely that such a statement will meet the standard for testimonial material under
Crawford because the statement is very similar to in-court testimony.
C. Purpose of the Statement
In the analysis of whether the rule announced in Crawford applies to a particular
statement, courts have also examined the declarant’s purpose for making the
statement. In some cases, the declarant’s primary motivation is to obtain protection
from danger or to be rescued from a dangerous situation.225 In such cases, courts
have usually held the statement to be nontestimonial.226 If, on the other hand, the
declarant makes the statement to provide information for a possible future legal
proceeding, the courts have held such statements to be testimonial.227 It can be a
difficult task for courts to distinguish between these different kinds of statements.228
As is the case with all of the factors, the outcome of these cases is often determined
by which factor is most prevalent in a given situation.
Emergency 911 calls have been placed in both categories. A nontestimonial plea
for help and protection229 may become a testimonial report of a crime that can be
used at a future judicial proceeding if the caller makes a specific accusation.230 The
caller may make such an accusation voluntarily or in response to questions from the
911 operator.231
The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed the validity of the distinction
between statements that are made to obtain protection and statements that are made
to provide incriminating evidence for Confrontation Clause analysis.232 The Court in
223

See Samarron v. State, 150 S.W.3d 701, 706-07 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

224

A recorded statement may not qualify as an excited utterance in most circumstances
because it is likely that such a statement would be obtained at a point when the declarant is no
longer under the stress of the exciting event. If the statement was admissible as an excited
utterance, however, the degree of formality and structure involved in procuring the statement
would qualify it as testimonial under Crawford.
225

The declarants in these cases are usually the victims of the crimes.

226

See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Ordinarily, statements
made to police while the declarant or others are still in personal danger cannot be said to have
been made with consideration of their legal ramifications . . . [T]herefore, . . . such statements
will not normally be deemed testimonial.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).
227
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (explaining that “‘pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorally’” are part of the core class
of testimonial statements (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23)).
228
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties.”).
229

See infra notes 237-65 and accompanying text.

230

See infra notes 307-15 and accompanying text.

231

See infra notes 329-38 and accompanying text.

232

See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
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Davis stated that if the purpose of the police interrogation is to respond to an
emergency, statements made in the course of the interrogation are nontestimonial.233
Conversely, if the purpose of the police interrogation is to establish the occurrence of
an event in anticipation of a future prosecution, statements made in the course of the
interrogation are testimonial.234 The Court in Davis described the distinction in terms
of the interrogation and not the statements themselves because interrogation had
produced the statements in the cases before them.235 The Court made clear that
“even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements,
not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate.”236
Thus, courts that made the distinction between these two kinds of statements in
the immediate aftermath of Crawford correctly anticipated the Court’s clarification
of Crawford in Davis. An examination of these cases illustrates that even with the
Davis decision as a guide, the distinction is not always a clear one.
1. Statements to Obtain Aid or to Reduce the Level of Danger
In People v. Moscat,237 the prosecution sought to introduce as evidence at trial a
recording of a 911 call.238 The court allowed the recording to be admitted as
evidence because it was not “testimonial” as that term is explained in Crawford.239
The Moscat court pointed out that 911 calls are among the most common form of
evidence in domestic violence cases.240 The court explained that, prior to Crawford,
it was fairly clear that the admission of 911 calls as excited utterances was not a
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.241 The Moscat court then
concluded that “[a] 911 call for help is essentially different in nature than the
‘testimonial’ materials that Crawford tells us the Confrontation Clause was designed
to exclude.”242 The victim usually generates these calls out of desire to be rescued
and protected from danger.243 In addition, the 911 call is not the equivalent of a
formal pretrial examination but rather the “electronically augmented equivalent of a

233

Id. at 2273.

234

Id. at 2273-74.

235

Id. at 2274 n.1.

236

Id.

237

People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).

238

Id. at 875.

239

Id. at 876.

240

Id. at 878.

241

Id.

242

Id. at 879.

243

Id.
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loud cry for help.”244 Lastly, the 911 call is part of the criminal incident itself and
not part of the prosecution that follows.245
In People v. Conyers,246 the prosecution sought to introduce two 911 calls made
within minutes of each other by a third party who had witnessed the defendant’s
alleged assault of the victim.247 In the first call, the witness screamed for police
assistance to stop a fight between her son and son-in-law.248 In the second call, the
witness screamed for an ambulance.249 The prosecution sought to introduce both
calls as excited utterances.250
The Conyers court concluded that neither call was testimonial.251 The court
reasoned that the witness made the calls as she was reacting to the serious situation
that was happening right in front of her.252 Her intention in making the call was to
stop the assault that was in progress and not to consider the legal consequences of
being a witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution.253 Because the statements were
not testimonial, their introduction at the defendant’s trial did not violate his Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford.254

244

Id. at 880.

245
Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 2006) (applying Davis
and holding that domestic assault victim’s statements to 911 dispatcher were admissible
because the purpose of the statements was to enable the police to respond to an ongoing
emergency). But see Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1193-1200 (2002) (arguing that participants in the violence that results in
911 calls are aware that statements made in such calls are likely to result in arrest and
prosecution and to be used as evidence against the defendant at trial). See generally David
Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic Violence
Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995 (2005) (discussing
discrepancies between the actual circumstances of the 911 call in Moscat and the facts recited
in the decision); Lininger, supra note 61, at 774, n.136 (pointing out that the Moscat court
incorrectly recited several of the facts in the case and that the prosecution eventually declined
to pursue the case because of problems with the evidence).
246
People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
247

Id. at 275.

248

Id.

249

Id.

250

Id.

251

Id. at 277.

252

Id. at 276-77.

253

Id. at 277.

254

Id. On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court agreed that the
911 calls were not testimonial in light of Davis because “the objective circumstances
indicate[d] that the primary purpose of the police questioning during the call was to enable
assistance during an ongoing emergency, rather than to establish some past fact.” People v.
Conyers, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S.
Ct. 2266, 2276-77 (2006)); see also People v. Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-14 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2005) (determining that a brief description of an attack in progress in a 911 call was not
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Similarly, the issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in United States v. Brito255 was whether and under what circumstances an excited
utterance in a 911 call should be considered testimonial.256 In Brito, an anonymous
911 caller engaged in a dialogue with the 911 operator, stating that she had heard a
gunshot, describing the suspect’s appearance and location and telling the operator
that the suspect had a handgun.257 During the trial, the prosecution sought to
introduce the tape of the 911 call as evidence.258 Except for the caller’s description
of the pistol, the court admitted the 911 tape as an excited utterance.259
On appeal, the defendant asserted that admission of the redacted version of the
911 tape violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the speaker.260 The
defendant’s first argument was that an objectively reasonable caller would have
understood that the statements given during the call would be available for use at a
subsequent prosecution.261 Second, the defendant contended that the statements
given after the questions posed by the 911 operator were the product of police
interrogation.262
After reviewing the three formulations of testimonial statements in Crawford and
the court decisions interpreting those formulations, the Brito court held that the 911
caller’s primary motivation was to neutralize the imminent danger that she faced
from the suspect and to obtain a prompt response from law enforcement.263 For that
reason, the caller lacked the “capacity to appreciate the potential long-range use of
her words,” making the call nontestimonial and admissible as an excited utterance.264
The questions from the 911 operator served to clarify and focus the caller’s statement
and were not interrogation.265
Victims also make statements with the primary purpose of escaping danger and
directing law enforcement agents to the scene of the incident. In State v. Maclin,266
two police officers arrived at the victim’s home as a result of a 911 hangup call.267
testimonial because the caller’s purpose was to obtain police intervention), leave to appeal
denied, 836 N.E.2d 1157 (N.Y. 2005).
255

United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).

256

Id. at 55-56.

257

Id. at 56.

258

Id. at 57.

259

Id. at 57-58.

260

Id. at 58.

261

Id. at 59.

262

Id.

263

Id. at 59-62.

264

Id. at 63.

265

Id.

266

State v. Maclin, No. W2003-03123-CCA-R3-DC, 2005 WL 313977 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Feb. 9, 2005), rev’d, 183 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006).
267

Id. at *2.
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Upon entering the house, the officers saw the defendant and the victim, who had
swelling and bruises on her face.268 The victim told one of the officers that she and
the defendant had gotten into an argument on the way home from work and that the
defendant had pulled out a gun, pointed it at her head and threatened to kill her if she
did not shut up.269 The defendant also threatened to kill the victim’s children.270 The
victim explained to the officer that the defendant had hit her in the face with his
hands.271
The Maclin court concluded that the victim’s statements to the police officer
were nontestimonial under Crawford.272 The victim, who feared for her safety,
summoned the police to her home and spoke to the police when they arrived there.273
The police did not obtain the statement through interrogation.274 Therefore, the
police officer’s testimony about those statements did not violate the defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.275
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and held that the victim’s
statements to the police were testimonial.276 The Maclin court anticipated the United
States Supreme Court’s rationale in Davis v. Washington,277 reasoning that the arrival
of the police neutralized any immediate danger faced by the victim.278 In addition,
because the victim gave such an extraordinarily detailed statement to the police, she
should have reasonably expected that the statement would be used prosecutorially.279
Even though the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the Tennessee Court of
268

Id.

269

Id.

270

Id.

271

Id.

272

Id. at *16-17.

273

Id. at *17. In this way, the victim also initiated the contact or interaction with the
police. See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
274

Maclin, 2005 WL 313977, at *17.

275

Id.; see also United States v. Griggs, No. 04 CR. 425(RWS), 2004 WL 2676474
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2004) (permitting police officer to testify at trial that, upon arriving on the
scene, he heard the statement, “Gun! Gun! He’s got a gun!,” and then saw the declarant
gesture at the defendant because the statement was not testimonial under Crawford).
276

State v. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d 335, 352 (Tenn. 2006).

277

The United States Supreme Court decided Davis five months after the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s decision in Maclin.
278

Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 352.

279

Id. The Court reached this conclusion by applying the third definition of testimonial
from Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). It is interesting to note that the police
in Maclin were dispatched to the residence of the victim and the defendant based on a 911
hang-up call. Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 339. Assuming that the victim made the call, if she had
stayed on the line and described the defendant’s attack on her as it was happening, her
statement would have been nontestimonial and, therefore, admissible under the standard
established in Davis five months later. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74,
2276-77 (2006).
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Criminal Appeals that the officers’ general questioning at the scene did not constitute
police interrogation, the Tennessee Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
on whether the victim’s statement was testimonial.280 The different results reached
by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Maclin clearly illustrate the difficulty that courts face in trying to characterize police
conduct as either responding to an emergency or gathering evidence for a future
prosecution.281
In Key v. State,282 a police officer who answered a disturbance call found the
defendant and the victim outside on the ground in an argument.283 The victim told
the officer that the defendant had restrained her since seven o’clock that morning,
that she had just run from the house and that the defendant had grabbed her and
pulled her to the ground.284
The Key court concluded that, by responding to the disturbance, the police officer
was not producing evidence for a potential criminal prosecution (which is one of the
situations discussed in Crawford).285 Rather, the officer was securing the scene and
assessing the situation.286 The court held that the underlying rationale of the excited
utterance exception supported the conclusion that the victim’s statements were not
testimonial.287
The cases reveal a willingness on the part of the courts to analyze these quickly
developing situations at each stage in order to determine whether any statements
implicate the Crawford doctrine. In Moscat,288 Conyers289 and Brito,290 the courts
agreed that the admission of statements made during 911 calls did not violate the

280

Maclin, 183 S.W.3d at 352.

281

See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that most police responses to reports of crimes “are both to respond
to the emergency and to gather evidence”) (emphasis in original).
282

Key v. State, 173 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).

283

Id. at 73.

284

Id.

285

Id. at 76.

286

Id.; see also Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 814-15 (D.C. 2005) (holding that
statements made by the victim to the police when the police first arrived at the scene of a
domestic disturbance were not testimonial because order had not yet been restored), reh’g en
banc granted, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005). But see Commonwealth v. Young, No. 0313 CR
5855 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Lynn May 7, 2004) (holding that victim’s statement to police officer
upon his arrival at the scene that her husband had hit her in the face and chest, which qualified
as an excited utterance, was inadmissible at trial because of the defendant’s inability to crossexamine the statement).
287

Key, 173 S.W.3d at 76-77.

288

People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).

289

People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
290

United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006).
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defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.291 The courts are reluctant, if not
completely unwilling, to exclude a statement made for the purpose of obtaining aid
or neutralizing a dangerous situation. Courts that admit such statements now do so
with assurance that they are correctly applying the rule laid out in Crawford, and
clarified in Davis. When the statements are made at the scene to law enforcement
authorities, the analysis necessarily turns to the level of questioning by the
authorities.
2. Statement as Evidence for Possible Future Prosecution or Other Legal
Proceeding292
If a declarant makes a statement to law enforcement agents in order to provide
evidence against an accused for a possible future prosecution, the statement is
testimonial.293 It is difficult to distinguish many of these statements from those that
are made for the purpose of obtaining aid. As previously illustrated, many
statements share characteristics that are common to both situations, and the
distinguishing factor is often the manner of questioning by law enforcement agents.
The court’s characterization of the statement will often depend upon which factor is
most conspicuous in the particular fact pattern.
An example of the difficulty in this area is Davis v. State,294 a case in which the
defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. When a
neighbor heard screams coming from the house where the victim and the defendant
lived together, she called 911 for police assistance.295 When the police arrived at the
house, the victim ran across the street to the neighbor’s yard.296 At trial, the neighbor
testified that the victim told her, “[h]e tried to kill me.”297
291
The rationale in these decisions conflicts with the thesis of Professor Friedman and
Professor McCormack regarding the awareness level of 911 callers. See Friedman &
McCormack, supra note 245; see also People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 415 (2004) (stating
that purpose of a 911 call is to supply information for potential use at a subsequent
prosecution); State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1265-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
purpose of victim’s 911 call was to report defendant’s violation of a protective order, which
provided evidence for his prosecution). Cortes is discussed infra at notes 329-38 and
accompanying text, and Powers is discussed infra at notes 307-15 and accompanying text.
292
This factor is derived primarily from the third definition of “testimonial” in Crawford:
“‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.’” Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3).
293

United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that excited
utterances were testimonial statements where victim could reasonably expect that her
statements would be used to prosecute the defendant), vacated on other grounds, 434 F.3d 396
(6th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-5384, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4995 (6th Cir.
Feb. 27, 2006).
294
Davis v. State, 169 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 203 S.W.3d 845 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006).
295

Id. at 663.

296

Id.

297

Id.
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One of the officers who responded to the 911 call testified that he followed the
victim to the front porch of the neighbor’s house.298 The victim was crying,
trembling and frightened, and she bore signs of injury on her body.299 The police
officer testified as to what the victim had told him on the neighbor’s porch, which
included the details of the defendant’s assault on her.300
The defendant argued that the admission of the police officer’s testimony about
what the victim had told him violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.301 In its analysis of whether the victim’s statement
to the police officer was testimonial under Crawford, the Davis court stated that “[a]
statement is more likely to be testimonial if the person who heard, recorded, and
produced the out-of-court statement at trial is a government officer.”302 The court
noted that simply because a statement qualifies as an excited utterance does not
necessarily mean that “it is ipso facto nontestimonial hearsay outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause and admissible into evidence. Each case must be examined on
its facts to determine if the evidence is testimonial and controlled by Crawford.”303
The victim’s statements to the police simultaneously served two objectives. The first
was to obtain assistance, and the second was to provide information for a possible
future prosecution.304
The Davis court conceded the difficulty in drawing the line between testimonial
and nontestimonial hearsay under Crawford.305 Ultimately, the court did not make
the determination and concluded that even if the victim’s statements were
testimonial, the admission of the testimony constituted error that did not contribute to
the conviction.306 The scenario in Davis precluded the court from characterizing the
statement as either primarily a call for assistance—which would be a nontestimonial
statement—or primarily the provision of information for a possible future
prosecution—which would be a testimonial statement.

298

Id. at 664.

299

Id.

300

Id.

301

Id. at 665.

302

Id. at 667.

303

Id. at 671.

304

Id. at 672.

305

Id.

306

Id. at 672-73. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant’s
conviction in Davis. Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Court
first held that the victim’s statements to the police were testimonial because they were “made
in circumstances objectively indicating that the emergency was over and that the investigation
had begun.” Id. at 849 (citing Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006)). The
statements were, therefore, erroneously admitted under Crawford. The Court also held,
however, that any error caused by the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because of the volume of evidence at trial demonstrating that the defendant
had attempted to strangle the victim. Id. at 849-56.
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In State v. Powers,307 the victim made a 911 call to the police to report that the
defendant had been in her home, which was a violation of the no-contact order
against the defendant. In his appeal of the jury’s guilty verdict, the defendant argued
that the trial court’s admission of the 911 tape of the victim’s call violated his rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.308
The defendant argued that the victim’s call was testimonial as defined by the
Court in Crawford because it constituted a pretrial statement that the victim would
reasonably expect to be used in the subsequent prosecution.309 The defendant
characterized the 911 operator as an “immediate conduit to the police” and argued
that the victim was aware of this connection when she made the call.310 Also,
because the victim was aware of the no-contact order, as she was named in it and
spoke of it on the telephone, she would have been aware that her 911 call would
result in the defendant’s arrest.311
Based on its examination of the transcript of the 911 call, the Powers court
concluded that the victim’s call was for the purpose of reporting a crime and not to
get help or protection.312 Because the victim called 911 to report the defendant’s
violation of the protective order and provided a description of him so that the
authorities could apprehend and prosecute him, she did not call for protection and,
therefore, her statements were testimonial under Crawford.313 The court rejected the
State’s argument and refused to adopt a bright line rule that would admit all 911
recordings into evidence.314 Thus, the victim’s awareness of the protective order
allowed the court to conclude that the statement was primarily to provide evidence
for a prosecution.315

307

State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

308

Id. at 1263.

309

Id. at 1263-64.

310

Id. at 1264; see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.2 (2006) (explaining
that 911 operators act as agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911
callers).
311

Powers, 99 P.3d at 1264.

312

Id. at 1265.

313

Id. at 1266; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245.

314

Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266.

315

See also People v. Ruiz, No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the victim’s statement to the police about the defendant threatening to kill her
with a handgun was testimonial). The victim’s statement in Ruiz was not an excited utterance,
but the case illustrates the difficulty of dealing with dual-purpose statements. Id. at *9. Even
though the victim was seeking aid and protection from the police, the court concluded that the
victim was aware that her complaint to the police would result in the defendant’s arrest and
prosecution because the conduct of which she complained was obviously illegal and highly
dangerous. Id. at *9.
Similarly, a victim’s statements to police that were made contemporaneously with the
defendant’s arrival on the scene were held to be both excited utterances and testimonial
statements because the victim was the only witness to the incident and could reasonably
expect that her statements would be used to prosecute the defendant. United States v. Arnold,
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In Lopez v. State,316 the court utilized a different rationale but reached the same
conclusion as the court in Powers. In Lopez, the police were investigating a reported
kidnaping and assault when they encountered the alleged victim standing in the
parking lot of an apartment complex. The victim told the police that a man had
abducted him in his own car at gunpoint, and he pointed to the defendant, who was
standing a short distance away in the parking lot.317 The victim also told the police
that the gun used in the abduction was in his car.318 The officers searched the car and
found a loaded gun under the front passenger seat.319 When the officers questioned
the defendant, he admitted that the gun belonged to him and that he had hidden it in
the victim’s car when he saw the police officers.320
The defendant’s position on appeal was that the trial court’s admission of the
victim’s statements about the gun violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to
confront the witnesses against him.321 The Lopez court agreed with the trial judge
that the victim’s statement qualified as an excited utterance, but the court also stated
that this determination did not necessarily mean that the statement was properly
admitted into evidence.322 The court then analyzed whether the statement made by
the victim to the police was testimonial under Crawford.323 The court concluded that
the statement was not made as a result of an interrogation, nor was it made in any
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits or depositions.324 The court held
that the statement was testimonial under Crawford because the victim made the
statement with the reasonable expectation that it would be used as evidence in a
subsequent court proceeding.325
It was significant that the victim made his statement in direct response to a police
officer’s question and that he accused the defendant of a crime in the statement.326 In
its analysis, the Lopez court placed importance on the declarant’s purpose in making
the statement: “[A] startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a
police officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement is a form of
accusation that will be used against the suspect.”327 The court contrasted such a
410 F.3d 895, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 434 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2005),
reh’g en banc granted, No. 04-5384, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4995 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006).
316

Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).

317

Id. at 695.

318

Id.

319

Id.

320

Id.

321

Id. at 695-96.

322

Id. at 697.

323

Id. at 698.

324

Id.

325

Id. at 698-700.

326

Id. at 699.

327

See id.; see also People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 8, 2004) (stating that no categorical rule excludes excited utterances from the Crawford
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statement to a spontaneous declaration made to friend or family member and
reasoned that such a statement would unlikely be regarded as testimonial.328

analysis and each excited utterance must be analyzed on its own terms to determine whether
Crawford applies). But see Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding excited utterance not testimonial because it was unrehearsed, made without reflection
or deliberation, and, therefore, not made in anticipation of its future use at trial), aff’d, 829
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d
945, 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (reaching same conclusion as court in Fowler), aff’d, 829
N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
328
Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 699. The Lopez court’s analysis on this point is consistent with the
statement in Crawford that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); see also State v.
Aguilar, 107 P.3d 377, 379 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (“The only manner by which Crawford
might be implicated is if the excited utterance is made in response to a police officer’s
query.”); People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding domestic
violence victim’s statements to a friend about the defendant’s conduct not testimonial because
they were not made to a law enforcement or judicial officer), aff’d, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005);
Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80-81 (Ga. 2004) (finding murder victim’s excited utterance
to a friend two weeks before the murder not testimonial under Crawford); State v. Staten, 610
S.E.2d 823, 827, 836 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statement of murder victim made during a
private conversation with his roommate that defendant had “pulled a . . . gun” on him not
testimonial under Crawford), cert. granted, 2006 S.C. LEXIS 93 (S.C. Mar. 9, 2006); State v.
Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of Ms. Coble to Mr.
Nordby, who was not a law enforcement agent, that Ms. Coble had seen a man with a pistol,
tried to call 911, and was panic-stricken, not testimonial under Crawford), review denied, 113
P.3d 482 (Wash. 2005); Dickinson, supra note 63, at 809 (finding no Confrontation Clause
concerns with an out-of-court statement if the government did not assist in the production of
such statement); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 518 (2005) (stating that one of the
unresolved issues in Crawford is “whether statements must be elicited by questions from a
government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by private individuals or
interrogators working for private groups can also qualify”).
The status of the statement’s recipient as a government agent or private individual is also
an important factor in cases dealing with hearsay exceptions other than excited utterances. See
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of
child sex abuse victim to a trained interviewer at a videotaped interview at which the deputy
district attorney and an investigator from the district attorney’s office were present to be made
under circumstances that would lead an objective observer to believe that the statement would
be accessible at a subsequent prosecution and, therefore, testimonial under Crawford); People
v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding statement of child sex abuse victim
to examining doctor, who was a member of child protection team and who spoke with the
police before performing the examination, to be made under circumstances that would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be used prosecutorially and,
therefore, testimonial under Crawford), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006);
In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding statement of child
sex abuse victim to grandmother testimonial under Crawford because the nature of the
testimony, and not the official or unofficial nature of the person testifying, determines
Crawford’s applicability), petition for appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).
In dissent, Justice Quinn stated that because the statements were not made to a
governmental actor, the statements could not be considered testimonial under Crawford. Id. at
1041 (Quinn, J., dissenting). In Justice Quinn’s view, even though Crawford did not
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In People v. Cortes,329 the defendant was charged with various crimes in
connection with the shooting of the victim. At trial, the prosecution sought to
introduce two separate 911 calls made by two different individuals who reported
seeing the shooting.330 The trial court excluded one of the tapes because the
statement on it was obtained through interrogation and was, therefore, testimonial.331
The court admitted a redacted version of the other tape because the declarant was
present at trial and subject to cross-examination.332
On the excluded tape, the record revealed that the 911 operator had asked the
caller a series of questions about the shooter’s location, description and direction of
movement.333 The court reasoned that the circumstances of some 911 calls,
specifically those calls that report a crime, come within the definition of
interrogation.334 Because the procedures for 911 calls were established and had rules
and recognized patterns for the collection of information, they constituted formal
statements as that term is used in Crawford.335
The Cortes court read Crawford as requiring a “reexamination of the basis for
treating spontaneous declarations as admissible hearsay, including statements in a
911 call reporting a crime.”336 In concluding that 911 calls to report a crime are
testimonial, the court reasoned as follows:
When a 911 call is made to report a crime and supply information about
the circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the information
is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding;
it makes no difference what the caller believes.
....
The 911 call reporting a crime preserved on tape is the modern
equivalent, made possible by technology, to the [pretrial] depositions
taken by magistrates or [justices of the peace] under the Marian committal
[act of 1555, which required preliminary examinations of prosecution
witnesses to determine if the evidence was sufficient to hold the accused
for trial]. Like the victims and witnesses before the King’s courts an
objective reasonable person knows that when he or she reports a crime the

completely define “testimonial,” the Crawford Court’s formulation of the core class of
testimonial statements would exclude the child’s statement to her grandmother. Id.
329

People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).

330

Id. at 402.

331

Id. at 402-03.

332

Id.

333

Id. at 404.

334

Id. at 404-05.

335

Id. at 406.

336

Id. at 415.
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statement will be used in an investigation and at proceedings relating to a
prosecution.337
The Cortes court put forth a “testimonial per se” rule with respect to 911 calls.
The court stated that such calls are testimonial regardless of the caller’s beliefs.338
There is debate as to whose perspective must be considered, the caller or the listener,
in the determination of whether any statement, including a 911 call, is testimonial.339
A bright line rule is somewhat easier for courts to apply because it allows them to
avoid making distinctions that are, at times, difficult to decipher. Ease of
application, however, is no justification for excluding statements made by a victim in
a 911 call who sought rescue or protection.340
The Watson case illustrates that law enforcement agents can procure both
testimonial and nontestimonial statements within a short period of time. The
analysis becomes more complicated when the court determines that a single
statement serves more than one purpose. In Davis, the court excluded a dual-purpose
statement.
Whether law enforcement agents obtained the statement at issue is significant but
not always determinative. In Lopez, the court placed great importance on the fact
that the victim made the statement to the police. In Powers, the court relied on the
victim’s awareness of the protective order to conclude that the victim’s statement
was primarily to provide evidence for a prosecution. It is unclear whether the result
would have been the same in the absence of such awareness.
IV. TOWARDS A MORE PRECISE STANDARD
In order to assess the Crawford decision’s impact on the admissibility of excited
utterances, the various factors discussed in Part III must be analyzed according to the
three definitions of “testimonial” set forth in the opinion. The goal will be to
produce a clear delineation of those excited utterances that are admissible even after
Crawford and those that would result in a Confrontation Clause violation if admitted.
This Article will then propose a composite definition that will take into account the
three definitions from Crawford and the application of those definitions in the cases.
Lastly, the Article will offer a slightly revised version of the composite definition
that will take into account the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington.
337

Id. at 415; see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 245, at 1193-1200.

338

Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 415.

339

See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (stating that the flaw in the definition of “testimonial” put forth by
the United States in its amicus curiae brief, a definition that included the notion of statements
“made in contemplation of legal proceedings,” was that it was unclear “whether the declarant
or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings”); Mosteller, supra note 328,
at 572 (discussing issues related to whose perspective matters in determining whether a
statement is testimonial).
340

See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2005) (cautioning “against the use
of an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the admission or exclusion of 911 calls”), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (declining to adopt
a bright line rule on whether 911 calls are testimonial or nontestimonial); People v. Conyers,
777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (admitting 911 call where caller’s intention in
placing the call was to stop an assault), aff’d, 824 N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
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The differences between the two definitions indicate that the Crawford decision did
indeed cause a degree of “interim uncertainty.”341
A. First Definition: In-Court Testimony or its Functional Equivalent
The Court in Crawford described the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements” as
“‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross examine [such as a deposition], or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.’”342 The first part of this
definition would not apply to excited utterances at all because statements in
affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations would not typically qualify as
excited utterances. Declarants who provide statements in these formats usually
provide them at some interval after any startling event or condition.
The last portion of the Crawford definition, however, includes statements that a
declarant would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially. This might include an
extremely broad class of statements, but the qualifier—“similar pretrial
statements”—requires the statements to be similar to the statements set forth in
affidavits, depositions or custodial examinations. These statements, in turn, are
defined as the “functional equivalent” of ex parte in-court testimony. Therefore, in
order to qualify as a “testimonial statement” under the first definition in Crawford, it
is insufficient for the declarant to reasonably expect the statement to be used
prosecutorially. Even if the declarant possesses this expectation, the statement must
still be “similar” to a statement that is the “functional equivalent” of in-court
testimony. Stated another way, the statement must be only two steps removed from
in-court testimony.
Therefore, statements made to law enforcement agents where the declarant
initiates the contact343 are not “testimonial statements” under this definition, and the
cases that have addressed this scenario have reached the same conclusion. To
conclude that the statement is not testimonial simply because it is an excited
utterance, as some of the cases do, does not take the analysis sufficiently far.344 The
341

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004).

342

Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23).

343

See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.

344

The Court in Crawford sought to separate the protections provided by the Sixth
Amendment from evidentiary rules regarding admissibility. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see
also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2004) (describing Crawford as
confirmation that rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause are separate legal
authorities); Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a
Union: Separating the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185,
185-86 (2004) (describing Crawford decision as a divorce between the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay rule). But see Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 572-73 (Mass.
2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part) (stating that prerequisites for excited utterance
exception are incompatible with characteristics that make a statement testimonial), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006); State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL
171441, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2005) (stating that the essential characteristics that
cause a statement to be an excited utterance render the statement nontestimonial), aff’d, 183
S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 47 (2006).
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more accurate formulation is that the statement is not testimonial because an excited
utterance made by the declarant through the initiation of contact with law
enforcement agents does not bear any similarity to pretrial statements such as
affidavits, custodial examinations or testimony.
Similarly, if the declarant’s purpose in making the statement is to obtain aid or to
be protected from a dangerous situation, the statement is not testimonial under this
definition.345 The courts have declined to characterize a statement as testimonial
when the sole purpose of the statement is to obtain protection or to be rescued. Even
if the declarant is partially motivated by the desire to provide evidence for a future
prosecution, such statements still fail to satisfy this definition of testimonial because
the statements are neither the functional equivalent of in-court testimony nor are they
similar to statements that qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony.
In addition, excluding these statements from the class of statements that qualify as
“testimonial” allows the police to perform one of their essential functions: aiding
those in danger and providing protection to them.
In many situations, statements that are produced as a result of questioning by law
enforcement agents still qualify as excited utterances.346 Under Crawford, however,
those statements are not admissible against a defendant at trial if they qualify as
testimonial.347 The courts’ analysis in these instances is whether the questioning was
structured or formal. The precise focus in these instances is whether the questioning
is sufficiently analogous to a “police interrogation” such that the resulting statement
is testimonial.348
The cases do not use the concept of “structured questioning” with any degree of
consistency, which makes it difficult to draw solid conclusions about its meaning. It
is clear that the questioning does not constitute a “custodial examination” or “police
interrogation” if the police are asking questions in the very early stage of the
investigation in order to assess the situation and determine exactly what happened.349
345
See supra notes 114-224 and accompanying text. This view is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (declaring
that a statement is nontestimonial when made in the context of an ongoing emergency).
346

See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 848-50 (Cal. Ct. App.), petition for review
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004); Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Tex. App. 2004), aff’d,
184 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
347

E.g., Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 849-51.

348

Crawford was unequivocal in its assertion that statements procured by the police during
an interrogation are testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 68. Even though the Court in
Crawford declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of testimonial, it stated that the term
“applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. (emphasis added).
Of course, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, the courts must now discern the
“primary purpose of the interrogation.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. It is not entirely clear
whether this will facilitate compliance with the rule. Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the standard in Davis “yields no
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”).
349
Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 714-716 (Tex. App. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
925 (2005); Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855-57; Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006); Hammon
v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d
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When the police investigation has progressed to the point where it has begun to focus
on a suspect, and the questions seek incriminating evidence about that particular
suspect, the questioning is sufficiently structured to be a custodial examination or
interrogation.350
Even if the investigation has begun to focus on a suspect about whom the police
are asking questions, statements given in response to such questions hardly seem to
qualify as the functional equivalent of in-court testimony. The statement at issue in
Crawford was a formal, tape-recorded statement given at the police station some
time after the incident itself.351 The statement was procured through police
interrogation and bore a similarity to in-court testimony in a way that a statement
given at the scene of the incident, or even at the hospital following the incident, does
not.
The courts that have applied Crawford are in agreement that when a declarant
makes a statement for the purpose of producing evidence against an accused for use
in a possible future prosecution, the statement is testimonial.352 The difficulty lies in
moving from this abstract principle to its practical application.353 Part of the
difficulty is that any statement provided to law enforcement agents who are
investigating a criminal incident could presumably be used in a future prosecution if
the perpetrator is apprehended and brought to trial. The Crawford definition focuses
on whether the declarant reasonably expects the statement to be used in a future
prosecution. The proposed composite definition will alleviate some of the
uncertainty in this standard.
If the statement constitutes a formal accusation of a criminal act, the statement is
testimonial because the declarant can reasonably expect that it will be used in a
subsequent prosecution.354 Because such formal accusations would likely qualify as
pretrial statements that bear a close similarity to in-court testimony, the statements
sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006); United States v. Webb, No. DV-33904, 2004 WL 2726100 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004).
350

Wall, 143 S.W.3d at 851. There is little dispute about the difficulty of distinguishing
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay under Crawford. See Davis v. State, 169
S.W.3d 660, 672 (Tex. App. 2005), aff’d, 203 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
351
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-39. In addition, the defendant’s wife had received Miranda
warnings prior to giving the statement. Id. at 38. Professor Friedman characterized the fact
pattern in Crawford as one involving “station house testimony.” Friedman, supra note 344, at
6. Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that Sylvia Crawford made the majority
of her statement in response to questions from the police. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-II,
2001 WL 850119, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001). Because the questioning of Sylvia
Crawford clearly qualified as “police interrogation,” the Court in Crawford never had to
address the less obvious forms of such police activity. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833
N.E.2d 549, 564 n.2 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J., concurring in part), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2982 (2006).
352

See supra notes 292-340 and accompanying text.

353

See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Attempts to draw a line between statements made in
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties.”).
354

Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 698-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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are testimonial according to the first definition in Crawford. If the declarant has
some special knowledge about the criminal history of the alleged perpetrator,355 or
accuses the alleged perpetrator of a particularly serious or violent crime,356 the
statement is more likely to be characterized as testimonial. As the cases illustrate,
the focus on the declarant’s subjective expectations in making the statement may
lead to results that are not entirely consistent with the specific holding of
Crawford.357
B. Second Definition: Extrajudicial Statements in Formalized Testimonial Materials
The Crawford Court took the second definition of testimonial statement directly
from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White v. Illinois.358 The Court defined
these materials as “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”359 This
definition is strikingly similar to the first part of the initial definition set forth in
Crawford. The emphasis is on the formalized nature of the materials. Therefore, the
analysis of the factors under the first part of the initial definition would also apply
here. In addition, statements in the formalized materials described in the second
definition are unlikely to qualify as excited utterances.
C. Third Definition: Reasonable Belief that Statement Will be Used at Trial
The final, and perhaps most general, definition of testimonial from Crawford
would include “‘statements that were made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial.’”360 This definition is similar to the last portion of the first
definition from Crawford, which talks about “‘pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used’” in a future prosecution.361 The difference is
that the first definition talks about the declarant’s expectation of the use of the
statement at trial. The third definition states the standard in terms of an “objective
witness.” It goes beyond the beliefs and expectations of the particular declarant and
establishes an objective standard.362
355

State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262, 1264-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

356

People v. Ruiz, No. B169642, 2004 WL 2383676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

357

This inconsistency may explain why the Court in Davis articulated an objective
standard for evaluating the circumstances surrounding the police interrogation and the
resulting statements. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
358

White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

359

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
360

Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3).
361

Id. at 51 (quoting Brief of Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23). The Court in Davis took the
objective standard one step further, stating it in terms of the circumstances involved in the
police interrogation and the resulting statements and not in terms of the declarant. See Davis,
126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
362
See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2005) (reiterating that the
objective standard contemplates a reasonable person in the declarant’s position); Wall v. State,
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Moreover, this third definition is primarily responsible for the inconsistent results
in the cases. One of the important factors in the application of this definition is the
status of the person to whom the statement was made.363 It also provides the lower
courts applying Crawford with a level of discretion that perhaps the Supreme Court
did not contemplate when it decided Crawford.364
Statements made to law enforcement agents for the purpose of obtaining aid or
protection are not testimonial under this definition. Under this objective standard,
such statements would not be available for use at a later trial because their purpose is
to neutralize a dangerous situation. Statements made at the police station or in a
similar investigative environment, especially when made in response to structured
police questioning, are testimonial. Such statements are testimonial even if they
qualify as excited utterances under state evidentiary law because an objective witness
would expect the statements to be available for later use at trial. Even though this
standard is phrased in terms of an “objective witness,” a particular declarant’s
knowledge that a statement will be used in a future prosecution is a factor to consider
in the determination of whether the statement is testimonial.365
D. Composite Definition
A final, composite definition of testimonial, which would be based on the
formulations in the Crawford decision and refined through an examination of the
cases dealing with excited utterances, would read as follows:
Testimonial evidence means
(a) Ex parte in-court testimony, including prior testimony during a
court proceeding such as a preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding,
motion hearing or trial;
(b) statements set forth in sworn affidavits;
(c) statements set forth in depositions;
(d) statements that constitute formal confessions; or
184 S.W.3d 730, 742-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“[T]he legal ruling of whether a statement is
testimonial under Crawford is determined by the standard of an objectively reasonable
declarant standing in the shoes of the actual declarant.”).
363

See Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
statement to a friend or family member is not made for the purpose of accusing someone in the
same way as a statement to a person of authority).
364
See United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (Howard, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“Many courts have resolved [the] uncertainty [created by
Crawford] by seizing on the most general formulation [of testimonial, which is the third
definition], and applying it, without sufficient attention to Crawford’s textual and historical
rationale.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855
(Cal. Ct. App.) (holding narrowly that despite three different definitions set out in Crawford,
statements made in response to police interrogation are testimonial), petition for review
granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
365
See People v. Watson, No. 7715/90, 2004 WL 2567124, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 8,
2004) (finding that interrogation occurs where declarant is aware that law enforcement agent’s
purpose in asking questions is to gather information to aid in suspect’s prosecution).
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(e) other pretrial statements that are substantially similar to those
items listed in subsections (a)-(d) that:
(i) are provided in response to questions from law enforcement
agents when the agents have thoroughly assessed a situation or
incident and have begun to focus their investigation on a particular
suspect or suspects;
(ii) are provided in response to questions from law enforcement
agents when such questions are detailed, structured, formal and
logically organized in a way that seeks specific, incriminating
evidence about a suspect or suspects;
(iii) are provided in response to questions from someone other
than a law enforcement agent when the questioning is conducted in
the presence of a law enforcement agent, at the behest and
direction of a law enforcement agent, or by a person directly
associated with the government’s investigation, and has the
characteristics of the questions in subsection (e)(ii); or
(iv) formally accuse a suspect of a specific crime when the
declarant has some particular knowledge of the suspect or the
nature of the crime.
Subsection (e) of this definition incorporates the concept of “statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” It sets forth the
general standard with a level of specificity that will make the standard more readily
applicable to new fact situations involving excited utterances. As illustrated by the
cases, the general standard is unpredictable and difficult to apply. The Court in
Crawford abandoned the Roberts test for the same reason. Subsection (e) attempts to
specify the “circumstances” that would cause a statement to qualify as testimonial,
and most of the situations in subsection (e) are a variation of police interrogation.366
An analysis of whether a particular manner of questioning by law enforcement
agents constitutes a custodial examination or interrogation must begin with the
Crawford case itself. Sylvia Crawford’s statement to the police was not an excited
utterance, but it is the appropriate starting point for a determination of the limitations
on questioning by law enforcement agents. The manner in which Sylvia Crawford
provided her statement to the police was completely different from a situation in
which the declarant makes a statement at the scene of an incident to law enforcement
agents, even if that statement is made in response to some degree of questioning.367
366
See Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless Prosecution?,
28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301, 321-22 (2005) (“At a minimum, . . . the Confrontation Clause
appears to apply to statements knowingly made to police in response to police-initiated
questions seeking incriminating information.”).
367
See Robert William Best, To be or Not to be Testimonial? That is the Question: 2004
Developments in the Sixth Amendment, ARMY LAW., Apr. 2005, at 65, 79. (“Whatever else can
be said about the Crawford opinion, the issue of Sylvia’s statement given during a police
interrogation was the issue of the case; everything else the Court addressed served as
background for the question before it.”).
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It is more likely that an excited utterance will implicate Crawford under one of
the situations in subsection (e) of the definition. A statement that meets the standard
in subsection (e) of the definition must still be “substantially similar” to the
formalized materials listed in subsections (a)-(d) in order to qualify as a testimonial
statement. Establishing a direct link between the statement in subsection (e) and the
specific examples of formalized materials in subsections (a)-(d) will provide courts
with more guidance in their application of the Crawford decision.368
Moreover, this connection finds support in the Crawford decision. After setting
out the various formulations of testimonial statements, the Court stated that “[t]hese
formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the [Confrontation]
Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”369 Perhaps the
“common nucleus” was that the statement must contain a degree of formality or
structure similar to those listed by the Court, and the belief in its availability for use
at a later trial was simply a “level of abstraction around” this requirement. The
formulation in subsection (e) of the composite definition transforms the abstract
notion of “belief in availability for use at a later trial” into readily identifiable and
specific examples. An excited utterance that fails to satisfy one of the formulations
in subsection (e) is unlikely to qualify as a testimonial statement. Thus, its
admissibility at trial would be determined according to state evidentiary law.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, lower courts tested the
parameters of the third definition from Crawford. In such cases, courts examined the
level of accuracy and precision in the declarant’s accusation and the seriousness of
the crime. A victim who simply points out the perpetrator to the police upon their
arrival on the scene (That’s the man who hit me) cannot be said to have met the
standard in subsection (e) of the definition. It is most likely that the victim is either
initiating the contact, seeking protection or both. In addition, a victim or witness
who provides information to the police in response to general, informal questions
(What’s going on here? or What happened?) is not providing testimonial evidence in
accordance with subsection (e).370 The focus under this definition must be on the
statement’s nature and purpose and not on the declarant’s emotional state.371
Similarly, a declarant who provides a statement to the police in response to
formal and direct questioning is more likely to produce a statement that meets the
standard in subsection (e). The circumstances surrounding such a statement would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution. This is the point at which state
evidentiary law and the Confrontation Clause part ways. The statement may qualify

368

See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 570-71 (Mass. 2005) (Sosman, J.,
concurring in part) (emphasizing the importance of articulating a definition of “testimonial”
that harmonizes all three formulations from Crawford), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006).
369

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).

370
See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 351, 353-54 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (vacating judgment and remanding case to the Court of
Appeals of Alaska for further consideration in light of Davis); United States v. Webb, No.
DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *3-5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2004). See also supra note
88.
371

Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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as an excited utterance, but as a testimonial statement, it can be admitted at trial only
if the defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the statement.372
It is clear that the Crawford decision presents new challenges in the area of
domestic violence crimes because the prosecution of such cases relies heavily on
statements made at the scene to law enforcement authorities and in 911 calls.373
Placing the emphasis on the statement itself and not on whether the person to whom
it was made is a government agent has the potential to expand the class of statements
that will be inadmissible under Crawford.
One of the unresolved issues in Crawford is “whether statements must be elicited
by questions from a government agent to be testimonial or whether questioning by
private individuals or interrogators working for private groups can also qualify.”374
Under the appropriate circumstances, a statement made to a private citizen would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a subsequent criminal prosecution.375 The standard in subsection (e)(iii) of
the definition contemplates such circumstances and attempts to bring some clarity to
this point. On the other hand, the absence of government officials from the
interaction negates the potential for abuse that concerned the Court in Crawford.376
It is important to be cognizant of two other aspects of the Crawford decision in
this context. The first is the statement in the majority opinion that “[a]n accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”377 On the other
hand, the cases illustrate that accusers sometimes make formal statements to
acquaintances378 and casual remarks to government officers.379 The lower courts
372
See, e.g., State v. Siler, 843 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (finding statement
both an admissible excited utterance under Ohio law and an inadmissible testimonial statement
under Crawford), appeal allowed, 847 N.E.2d 5 (Ohio 2006).
373
See Jaros, supra note 245, at 1000-03; King-Ries, supra note 366, at 305, 318; Lininger,
supra note 61, at 768-83, 816; Donna D. Bloom, Comment, “Utter Excitement” About
Nothing: Why Domestic Violence Evidence-Based Prosecution Will Survive Crawford v.
Washington, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 717 (2005); Celeste E. Byrom, Note, The Use of the Excited
Utterance Hearsay Exception in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases after Crawford
v. Washington, 24 REV. LITIG. 409 (2005).
Both of the cases before the Supreme Court in Davis were domestic violence cases. Davis
v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279-80 (2006). The respondents in those cases, the states of
Washington and Indiana, argued that such cases “require[] greater flexibility in the use of
testimonial evidence.” Id. at 2279. The Court acknowledged that victims of domestic
violence are particularly susceptible to intimidation or coercion and that they often decline to
testify at trial. Id. at 2279-80. The constitutional guarantees, however, must still be the
primary concern. Id. at 2280.
374
Mosteller, supra note 328, at 518. The issue remains unresolved. See Davis, 126 S. Ct.
at 2274 n.2 (“[O]ur holding today makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when
statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”).
375

See supra note 328.

376

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).

377

Id. at 51.

378

See In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32, 1034-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), petition for
appeal allowed, 833 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 2005).
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need guidance on whether the admission of such statements against defendants
violates their rights under the Confrontation Clause.380 Subsection (e) of the
composite definition provides this guidance.
The second aspect of the decision is the concern expressed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his concurring opinion that “any classification of statements as
testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat
arbitrary.”381 Certainly sworn affidavits and depositions are part of the core class of
testimonial statements. A classification of other statements as testimonial, including
certain excited utterances, need not be arbitrary. If the basis of that classification is
an objective belief in that statement’s availability for use at a later trial, the statement
must be in a format that is substantially similar to a sworn affidavit or deposition and
must meet one of the standards set forth in subsection (e) of the proposed composite
definition. In this way, the appropriate balance will be struck between an accused’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause and the government’s ability to prosecute its
cases.
Application of the proposed composite definition would be consistent with
Crawford. The definition must be slightly altered, however, in light of the Davis
decision. The most significant difference after Davis is that the statements described
in subsection (e) of the definition need not be “substantially similar” to the
statements listed in subsections (a)-(d). As illustrated by Hammon v. Indiana, the
companion case to Davis v. Washington, the statement can qualify as testimonial
379

See United States v. Webb, No. DV-339-04, 2004 WL 2726100, at *1-3 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Nov. 9, 2004); Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 829
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2862 (2006).
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See Friedman, supra note 344, at 9 (stating that participation by government officials is
not the essence of what makes a statement testimonial).
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Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This view is reflected in three
United States Circuit Court decisions issued after Crawford involving hearsay exceptions
other than excited utterances in which the courts held that statements, which did not involve
police or government agents, were not testimonial. See Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 44445 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding victim’s statements to numerous witnesses prior to the victim’s
murder by her husband not to fit the definition of “testimonial” under Crawford), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1067 (2005); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2004) (declining to find
as testimonial statements to a third party witness, made by person who had accompanied
accused on the day of murder, that accused needed money and that victim had refused to give
him drugs on credit), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1093 (2005); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d
832, 837-38, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (testimony of victim’s half brother regarding victim’s
statements to him implicating the defendant properly admitted because statements were “not
the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”).
One case that admitted a testimonial statement was People v. Ko, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1051 (2006). At trial, a detective who had
investigated the murder testified to statements made by the defendant’s girlfriend about bloody
clothing found at the murder scene. Id. at 44. Even though the statements were testimonial,
they were not barred by Crawford because the defendant opened the door to the admission of
the entire statement concerning clothing found at the murder scene. Id. at 44-45. The court
was concerned that “[a] contrary holding would allow a defendant to mislead the jury by
selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial statement that are potentially helpful to
the defense, while concealing from the jury other details that would tend to explain the
portions introduced and place them in context.” Id. at 45.
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even if it is made at the scene of the incident itself, as long as it is made after the
incident is over382 “at some remove in time from the danger.”383 Subsections (e)(ii)
and (e)(iv) of the definition remain unchanged because they more clearly qualify as
testimonial statements after Davis. Subsection (e)(iii) remains unchanged and
unresolved, but it seems that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of
classifying such statements as testimonial.
V. CONCLUSION
Crawford established a new standard for the admission of testimonial statements
by a witness who is not present at trial. It overruled the standard in Ohio v. Roberts,
which examined whether the statement bore adequate indicia of reliability, because
the standard in Roberts provided inadequate protection for defendants’ rights under
the Confrontation Clause.
An understanding of Crawford’s effect on the admissibility of excited utterances
requires an understanding of which statements the Crawford Court meant to include
in its definition of “testimonial statement.” Rather than focusing exclusively on
whether the recipient of the statement is a government officer or private citizen, the
analysis must focus on whether the statement meets one of the standards set forth in
subsection (e) of the proposed composite definition. Even if the statement satisfies
one of the standards, however, the statement must bear an appreciable similarity to
formalized materials such as affidavits and depositions. This analysis is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s statement in Crawford that all formulations of testimonial
statements “share a common nucleus.”384
If the declarant initiates contact with law enforcement agents to seek aid or
protection, the statement is not testimonial. If there is some degree of formal or
structured questioning to procure the statement, then it is testimonial even if it
qualifies as an excited utterance. If the questioning meets the standard, the
questioner need not necessarily be a law enforcement agent. The questioning need
only be conducted at the behest or in the presence of a law enforcement agent.
In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court clarified its decision in Crawford v.
Washington. The degree of formality or structure in the questioning is no longer the
primary consideration in determining whether the responses to those questions
constitute testimonial statements. Rather, the focus seems to be on the timing of the
questioning and whether it takes place at a point removed in time from the
threatening situation that gave rise to it.
Both federal and states courts will continue to develop and interpret the Supreme
Court’s rulings in Crawford and Davis. It remains to be seen whether the “primary
purpose”385 test from Davis will produce consistent results, or results that require
further clarification.
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Id. at 2279.

384

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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